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Abstract—With an enormous range of applications, Internet
of Things (IoT) has magnetized industries and academicians
from everywhere. IoT facilitates operations through ubiquitous
connectivity by providing Internet access to all the devices with
computing capabilities. With the evolution of wireless infras-
tructure, the focus from simple IoT has been shifted to smart,
connected and mobile IoT (M-IoT) devices and platforms, which
can enable low-complexity, low-cost and efficient computing
through sensors, machines, and even crowdsourcing. All these
devices can be grouped under a common term of M-IoT. Even
though the positive impact on applications has been tremendous,
security, privacy and trust are still the major concerns for such
networks and an insufficient enforcement of these requirements
introduces non-negligible threats to M-IoT devices and platforms.
Thus, it is important to understand the range of solutions
which are available for providing a secure, privacy-compliant,
and trustworthy mechanism for M-IoT. There is no direct
survey available, which focuses on security, privacy, trust, secure
protocols, physical layer security and handover protections in M-
IoT. This paper covers such requisites and presents comparisons
of state-the-art solutions for IoT which are applicable to security,
privacy, and trust in smart and connected M-IoT networks.
Apart from these, various challenges, applications, advantages,
technologies, standards, open issues, and roadmap for security,
privacy and trust are also discussed in this paper.
Index Terms—Security, Privacy, Trust, Protocols, IoT, M-IoT,
Survey and Analysis, Roadmap
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile-Internet of Things (M-IoT) offers vendors a utility
for providing smart services to their users by forming a highly
sustainable, secure and cost-effective network [1] [2] [3]. The
smart M-IoT paves a way for incorporating a large set of
services like healthcare, business monitoring, strategic planning,
public safety communications, weather forecasting, navigation,
reconnaissance, and data acquisition. Security and efficiency
of these services are the main objectives of organizations
aiming at the spread of smart M-IoT. M-IoT focuses on user-
specific commercialization, where users pay as per their active
applications while offering them with flexible and dynamic
procedures for the selection of a service [4] [5] [6]. In order
to enhance the security, utility and lifetime of services, most
of the established business enterprises are looking forward to
procuring long range and low power solutions for connecting
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billions of devices to their core networks without much
dependence on the existing infrastructure. Such an ideology
allows for easier management and configuration of M-IoT
networks and associated devices. Solutions like Low Power
Wide Area Network (LPWAN), Long Range Wide Area
Network (LoRaWAN) and Narrow Band-IoT (NB-IoT) are
efficient in deploying M-IoT networks [7]–[10]. However, at
the moment, both the technologies are rival to each other and
their applicability and use cases are subject to the decisions
of deploying companies and the regulations of the countries
involved in their development. With better reach and ease of
deployment over existing cellular setup, NB-IoT and Long
Term Evolution for Machines (LTE-M) are under consideration
as their unification will enhance the types of applications
for M-IoT by adopting service strategies similar to mobile
networks [11] [12].
The major interests of some leading organizations have been
towards the establishment of a different spectrum which is also
obtained as a dedicated range from their allocated space or fre-
quency band. Technologies like Software-Defined Networking
(SDN) and Network-Function Virtualization (NFV) provide
an altogether different way for deploying these networks in
a secure way [13] [14] [15]. With a centralized controller, a
common node helps to monitor the network, whereas network
slicing through NFV will help to distribute the implementation
and management of SDNs. M-IoT can operate as a separate
slice, and a local or global controller can manage the related
activities. Procedures like secondary authentication and group
authentication can be seen as potential solutions for ensuring
security in smart M-IoT. However, the effective implementation
of rules and policies at the control layer due to the configuration
complexity and artifacts requires intelligent solutions that can
be assured by using certain aspects of optimization, machine
learning or artificial intelligence.
In smart M-IoT, security refers to the protection of the
infrastructure from potentially hazardous components and users,
which may exploit the network with vulnerabilities, based on
the known/unknown cyber attacks. For privacy, it deals with
the preservation of lawfulness in sharing the information about-
and-between the involved devices. Since smart M-IoT will be
dealing with a lot of connected components, maintenance of
isolation in traffic patterns and establishing anonymity of users
becomes an utmost requirement. Trust refers to the faithfulness
in the identification of devices for communication. It further
involves the reputation-building between the devices and the
infrastructure leading a way to make the network secure while
preserving its privacy.
Current market trends have shown that despite several
solutions for establishing M-IoT communications, the end to
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
05
36
2v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 13
 M
ar 
20
19
2	


	



 



	
Fig. 1. An overview of M-IoT applications.
end security will be one of the major concerns for the mobile
operators. Identification of new cyber threats, which consist in
zero-day attacks is another major requirement of the security
industry [16] [17]. It is estimated that M-IoT will hit the
market by 2025 with maximum revenue being generated from
the security, privacy and trust-based services. Even the major
role players will be a low power long range communication
models, which can be evaluated around 15+ billion dollars
at the same time [18]. Thus, it is required that the existing
state-of-the-art must be followed and evaluated on the basis of
performance metrics and parameters that enhance the security,
privacy, and trust in M-IoT.
A. Advantages and Applications of Smart M-IoT
Smart M-IoT focuses the applications which help in regu-
lating the daily works of their users. Smart M-IoT provides a
different set of applications in largely diversified areas such
as a smart factory, smart city, smart home, smart grid [19]–
[22], healthcare, personal care, emergencies [23], as shown in
Fig. 1. With smart M-IoT, it becomes easier for both users
as well as business organization to accommodate and host
services through intelligent architecture with effective security.
In terms of market trends, business houses are looking at
a huge monetary advantage from smart M-IoT networks and
applications. Including these, other advantages and applications
of smart M-IoT are as follows:
• Formation of the contextual network through intelligent
and rapid data acquisition and processing.
• Self-configuring capacity and support for a large set of
devices through a common interface.
• Support for human to device and device to device
communication with lower overheads and low-complexity.
• Information management, processing, and validation and
data flow management across a wide range of the network.
• Support for real-world applications such as driverless
cars, urban-surveillance, smart retailing, industrial Internet,
and even provisioning of application base for Augmented
Reality (AR)/Virtual Reality(VR) services.
• Low-cost deployment and development of personal appli-
cations as well as private networks and clouds.
• Requires low-frequent maintenance and can be operated
through distant mode. On-site evaluations may be subject
to special requirements and upgrades.
• Supports crowdsourcing as well as edge-computing models
by forming an on-demand network in case of public safety
communications.
• Industrial automation and personalized control formations
through light-weight and low-complex Integrated Devel-
opment Environments (IDEs). Further, M-IoT also helps
in tracking the traffic-flows by incorporating transmis-
sions over dynamic nodes, such as drones, smart cars,
autonomous bicycles and rail networks.
B. Utilities, Contributions and Structure of this Survey
This survey covers a majority of the content related to
security, privacy, trust-management and protocols for smart M-
IoT networks. The content presented in this article is competent
compared to the existing surveys and is different in terms
of comparative study, which will help its readers follow the
parameters and ideology of existing works. Further, this survey
can be used by the researchers at any level; especially new
researchers can gain a lot from the comparisons and the
roadmap sections. Academicians can follow this article to teach
new trends related to security of M-IoT and its advancements.
This work can help industry researchers to follow what has
been done and what can be carried further while deploying
applications related to M-IoT. The open challenges presented
in the lateral part of this article will help to define problem
statements and can be used as a rationale for continuing
research on security, privacy and trust aspects of M-IoT.
This is a comprehensive survey that collectively covers
security, privacy, and trust for smart M-IoT, which otherwise
are presented as individual topics in the existing surveys.
The tabular studies provide a single source to understand
the novelty and reach of existing state-of-the-art solutions
for smart M-IoT. The roadmap and comparisons with the
related survey articles along with key contents to follow for
enhancing the knowledge of this subject are given in Section
II. Section III presents characteristics, challenges, technologies
and standards, an overview of security, privacy and trust along
with their methodologies for evaluation. Section IV gives
details on secure frameworks for smart M-IoT, Section V
discusses the security aware protocols, Section VI presents
privacy preservation approaches, Section VII gives details on
trust management approaches, Section VIII discusses physical
layer security and Section IX gives details on the handover
security for smart M-IoT networks. Research Challenges, open
issues, and future directions are presented in Section X. Finally,
Section XI concludes this article. The details of abbreviations
and key terms used throughout the paper are presented in
Appendix.Table II with the list of tables shown in Table I.
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Fig. 2. A Roadmap of different studies on security, privacy and trust in IoT and M-IoT between 2010 and 2018.
TABLE I
LIST OF TABLES.
Tables Descriptions
Appedix.Table II Abbreviations and Key Terms.
Appedix.Table III Comparison with Related Survey Articles.
Appedix.Table IV Some key contributions to follow for security, privacy and trust in smart M-IoT.
Appedix.Table V Types of attacks in M-IoT.
Appedix.Table VI State-of-the-art frameworks applicable to M-IoT security.
Appedix.Table VII State-of-the-art protocols for M-IoT security.
Appedix.Table VIII State-of-the-art approaches for data privacy in M-IoT.
Appedix.Table IX State-of-the-art approaches applicable for trust management in M-IoT.
Appedix.Table X State-of-the-art approaches for physical layer security in M-IoT.
Appedix.Table XI Proactive authentication mechanisms for secure handovers.
Appedix.Table XII Approaches for secure handovers in M-IoT.
II. ROADMAP AND COMPARISON WITH RELATED SURVEY
ARTICLES
Fig. 2 helps to follow the roadmap of different surveys
presented over the period of time that can be used for selecting
an appropriate approach for justifying the requirements of M-
IoT networks in terms of security, privacy, and trust. In addition
to this, Appendix.Table III provides comparative evaluations
and reachability of existing studies which are closely related
to the survey presented in this article. There are limited works
that focus on the details of M-IoT. Only a few of them have
written in parts about such requirements and technologies for
supporting communications in smart M-IoT. Despite the limited
literature in this direction, some of the key and broad surveys
have been selected which provides sufficient material to be
followed for covering the aspects related to security, privacy,
and trust. From the comparisons, it is evident that the closely
related survey is the one provided by Feng et al. [24], but it
covers major portions related to Mobile Crowdsourcing (MC),
which is not so tightly related to the requirements of smart
M-IoT. The other studies in [25]–[37] do not focus on major
considerations which are mandatory to form a highly secure,
private and trustworthy M-IoT networks. Sicari et al. [38], Arias
et al. [39] and Yang et al. [40] have discussed the concepts
related to M-IoT, but do not cover enough details on the
security, privacy and trust management in smart M-IoT. In
addition to these, there are no comparative strategies provided
for discussing the protocol and framework security in any of
these surveys, which is a major limitation. Further, handoffs
are the major part of mobile-oriented networks, which are
not evaluated in the existing studies. Thus, the necessity of
such a study, in-depth evaluations and conceptual-reachability
of the proposed survey will help researchers to gain insight
into the requirements of secure communications in smart and
connected M-IoT. In addition, Appendix.Table IV presents
some of the other key contributions, which can be followed for
understanding the present standings in the security of M-IoT
devices and its applications.
III. SMART MOBILE IOT NETWORKS AND ITS SECURITY:
AN OVERVIEW
This section presents characteristics and challenges of
smart M-IoT. The details are presented on the different types
of technology enablers, standards, and general stacks for
implementing such a network.
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Fig. 3. An exemplary illustration of M-IoT scenario and trends in modern day networks. The figure shows crucial aspects and properties to be satisfied for the
efficient implementation of M-IoT on the backbone of cellular infrastructure.
A. Characteristics of Smart Mobile IoT Networks
Smart M-IoT focuses on reliable and sustainable connectivity
between the devices on the move, as shown in Fig. 3. Smart M-
IoT focuses on the establishment of a trust relationship between
the devices through an enhanced reputation-cycling. Depen-
dence on Machine to Machine (M2M) communication [41],
Device to Device (D2D) marking, in-built-service sharing, and
energy conservation are the key characteristics of M-IoT. With
the devices operating in a battery constrained environment, M-
IoT characterizes on the utilization of technologies that offer a
wide range but at low battery consumption. The characteristics
of smart M-IoT can be summarized as follows:
• M-IoT includes devices with low power, but operable up
to a wide range with lower complexity and lesser resource
consumptions.
• Supports ultra-dense communication with a unique feature
of reliability despite such a huge number of devices
operating simultaneously.
• M-IoT may be subjected to frequent handovers and may
be involved in inter- or intra-handovers depending on their
network design and deployment.
• Licensed and shared spectrum usability with a primary
focus on services similar to short messages. Most of the
applications do not require any retraining, and configu-
rations are automatically loaded as a part of application
program.
• Smart M-IoT applications and services are vendor specific.
However, the licensing of narrow bands can be governed
by small-scale network organizations with core setups at
the big business houses.
• M-IoT operations are dependent on the synergy among the
mobile operators and rely heavily on the trust-relationship
for their security and distributions.
• One-tap facilities for all the services, where a user just has
to install and load a required feature for experiencing the
applications that focus on consumer-electronics, healthcare
of smart home automation.
• M-IoT needs media independent support for most of the
applications as some of the entities may be operating on
3G, while other may have 4G/LTE or even the upcoming
5G accessibility through mmWave functionalities.
• Virtualization and privatization of services are the other
main characteristics of M-IoT. Virtualization has further
been leveraged through the properties of network slicing,
which is one of the solutions for distributed security.
• Support for immediate acquisition, decision and action
are the major features of smart M-IoT. Management of
information and building contextual relationships are the
other unique characteristics of smart M-IoT.
B. Challenges of Smart M-IoT
Despite a huge set of advantages, there are some crucial
challenges associated with the fully-functional usability of
smart M-IoT applications. These include,
• Complexity of design: M-IoT faces a major challenge
because of design complexity for both its applications as
well as network. The applications must be low-complex
and must not require extra knowledge for operations by
its users. Further, with the requirements of ease of use,
M-IoT may cause excessive burden on the developers for
designing an easy to follow and deploy environment.
• Interaction policies: Smart M-IoT is governed by the
rules through which applications interact with each other
for facilitating the services to its users. However, the
difference in the configuration and operable technology
makes it difficult for using common interaction policies
for all M-IoT devices. Thus, the formation of rules and
generation of interaction policies through consensuses are
extremely tedious in M-IoT.
• Security: Independently on the technology, security has
always been a concern for all types of IoT applications.
5Prevention against known and unknown attacks and miti-
gation of zero-day possibilities are the key requirements
for security solutions which aim at regulating M-IoT appli-
cations [42]. Security solutions must be light-weight and
should be able to handle the tradeoffs with the performance
of a device or the network. Apart from general security,
these networks are also subject to crucial requirements
of handover security, which can be obtained through
existing authentication mechanisms while focusing either
on pre-authentication or post-authentication mechanisms
depending on the needs and requirements of an application.
Management of insider threats and policing are other
requirements of security solutions [43]–[46].
• Privacy: With most of the applications personalized in
M-IoT, leakage of a users’ information may pose a huge
threat to the entire network and can destroy an individual’s
belongings. With billions of devices in place, data privacy
may be a reason for huge performance overheads in these
networks. Thus, it is inevitably important to support data
privacy which is otherwise a key challenge for smart
M-IoT.
• Trust: Security and privacy are established through trust-
relationships between the service providers and the users.
Trust validations and support for common-reputation sys-
tems that can guarantee a low-overhead based mechanism
for trust-maintenance are a huge challenge for smart M-
IoT networks.
• Low-complexity protocols: Different applications need
different protocols to communicate, which raises concerns
about compatibility issues in terms of protocol selection
and arriving at a general agreement during sharing of
context between the cross-platform applications. Thus, de-
signing of low-complex protocols with high compatibility
and ease of upgrading are the key challenges to handle
in smart M-IoT applications.
• Lifetime: Since the devices in M-IoT are operable through
batteries, it is required that the applications, as well as
network architectural support functions, should not cause
an excessive computational burden on the devices which
may deplete their resources leading to a network shutdown.
Thus, enhancement of life, capacity and coverage should
be managed in smart M-IoT networks.
Apart from these issues, some of the key attacks in M-IoT,
against which effective countermeasures are required, are listed
in Appendix.Table V and the summaries of characteristics,
challenges and technologies are shown in Fig. 4.
C. M-IoT Technologies, Standards, and Stacks
There are a plethora of articles that have discussed various
technologies, standards, and stacks which are applicable to
M-IoT. However, to make this article self-contained, general
information on some of these are presented in this section.
For further clarification, an illustration of a general overview
of M-IoT stack is shown in Fig. 5, which can be further
studied from [47] [48]; and an exemplary illustration of
security, trust and privacy formations in M-IoT is presented
in Fig. 6. At present, M-IoT is based on low power and
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Fig. 4. M-IoT Overview: General characteristics of M-IoT networks, challenges
in implementation and technologies available for successful deployment of
M-IoT.
wide range technologies, which include 6LoWPAN, LPWAN-
based LoRaWAN, Random Phase Multiple Access (RPMA),
NB-IoT, Ultra Narrow Band-IoT (UNB-IoT) Weightless-W,
Weightless-P, and Weightless-N [9], [49]–[53]. Besides these,
existing network architectures such as 3G, 4G/LTE, Worldwide
Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX), ZigBee,
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), can be used
for supporting applications in M-IoT. The standards for IoT vary
depending on the application scenario and the configurations
of the devices used in M-IoT. In general, various open projects,
organizations, alliances, and IEEE provide a series of standards
that primarily focus on supporting smart applications in IoT
networks. Some of these are TR-069, OMA-DM, DNS-SD,
IEEE series 2413, 21451, 11073, 2200, 2030, 1905, 1900-
03, 1701-03, etc. Further details on each of them can be
obtained from [54] and [55]. Apart from these technologies
and standards, there are different types of stacks used for
supporting smart mobile communications in IoT. However, the
general use of stack can be application or network specific and
varies as per the configurations of each device. Usually, the
stack selections will be affected by the technologies adopted
for communications in M-IoT. It is recommended to form
compatible and ready-to-integrate models which can be easily
deployed in any sort of scenarios irrespective of the device
configurations, type and make. Stacks applicable for general
IoT can be used for extending services in M-IoT but with
modifications to their operating policies as the majority of
the traffic flow is maintained on the devices that are non-
static in nature [56]. Some of the key solutions for IoT stacks
include IBM-Watson IoT [57], Microsoft Azure IoT suite [58],
OpenIoT [59], OCF [60], etc.
D. Vulnerabilities in smart M-IoT
Information security is the major factor driving security
in smart M-IoT. These are lead by the studies on vulnera-
bilities and loopholes at the hardware level, protocol-level,
and application-level of M-IoT. Vulnerabilities are studied
based on the mode of attack and assessment into different
types of classes, related to hardware, protocol, application,
software or organizational [61] [62]. The exploitation of the
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Fig. 5. An exemplary overview of a general M-IoT stack.
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Fig. 6. An exemplary illustration of security, trust and privacy aspects in
M-IoT.
known vulnerabilities can be prevented by taking several
countermeasures against each of the exploits, however, for
unknown vulnerabilities, it is tedious to distinguish and resolve
until the severity of exploits are unknown [63].
For major of the smart M-IoT, date of release or disclosure
plays a crucial role in prevention and it helps to decide the
window of prevention. The release of security patches and
security updates are further accounted based on the disclosure
dates. Usually, increasing the speed of deliverables causes an
impact on the debugging phase, which may lead to several
possible vulnerabilities unhandled. In smart M-IoT, most
common vulnerabilities are identified as the OS level or the
application level. The protocol level vulnerabilities are usually
known and steps can be determined based on the deployment.
However, in several cases, where protocol security is based on
credentials, their theft can lead to severe consequences. Some of
the key issues causing/leading to vulnerabilities, as discussed
by Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [64]–
[67](Fig 7), for smart M-IoT are listed below:
• Insecure infrastructure: One of the main causes of vulner-
abilities in smart M-IoT is the insecure infrastructure that
supports transmissions for the involved devices. Architec-
tural layout plays a key role in accessing the network and
prioritizing its security. The dominant mode of connections
for M-IoT is a cloud, edge, fog architectures, which needs
to be prevented from unauthorized access.
• Common managing interface: The services which are
obtained through a common managing interface are more
likely to fall prey to vulnerabilities than the services
which are handled by the individual servers. This can
be further seen from another dimension. The exploit of
vulnerabilities over a common interface may expose the
additional services provisioned through it.
• Insecure protocols: The protocols mounted for data sharing
and authentication in smart M-IoT may be vulnerable to
attacks leading to authorization and access control. Thus,
the unlimited role of users and non-predetermining the
security of the underlying protocol can be other issues
causing vulnerabilities in smart M-IoT.
• Inefficient transport and data encryption: Usually the
broadcasted traffic is not encrypted to avoid performance
issues. Thus, vulnerabilities related to access control, such
as eavesdropping, is always possible because majority
messages are not encrypted.
• Cross-site scripting (XSS): Such vulnerabilities are related
to insecure web access and are based on access controls
such as the same-origin policy, which is applicable to all
the devices in M-IoT. Self and mutated XSS are major
concerns to be taken care of while dealing with these
types of vulnerabilities.
• Firmware insecurity: Identification and decision on
firmware insecurity is not an easy task. These involve
expertise and a common user may easily be fooled to
disclosing his/her devices to malicious agents. Such agents
exploit the firmware insecurity and lead to several open
ports which allow backdoors, worms, trojans, botnet and
ransomware to exploit the known/unknown issue on the
device.
• Process isolation and unauthenticated scans: Several users
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Fig. 7. An illustration of vulnerabilities in smart M-IoT with possible remedies.
allow different processes to take control over the device
and allow unauthenticated scans. Majority of them are
caused by presenting the requirements of an installed
application. Non-evaluation of the downloaded application
and free access to control the devices leads to several
application-level vulnerabilities.
• User policies and patching: In the majority of the cases,
vulnerabilities are exploited due to limited action from
the users. Delays in updating the security settings and
unawareness of the released patches lead to the majority
of the vulnerabilities. Nowadays, organizations are taking
several key steps to force the security updates, still, there
is a gap between the user-understandings and update
procedures, which lead to several exploits and threats
on smart M-IoT.
Key solutions and possible remedies for preventing the above-
discussed vulnerabilities are given below:
• Access control: Limiting the control over device-data and
allowing authorized applications to access can help limit
the exploits on the known vulnerabilities. Evaluating the
content to be accessed and components of shared-data can
further elevate the security of devices in smart M-IoT.
• Quick identification and release of patches: It is deter-
mined that mode and action and time of action play a
key role in preventing a device. Thus, quick identification
of vulnerability, release of security patches and installing
them are major actions that can prevent against severe
attacks.
• Credential management: For the network-based vulner-
ability prevention, credential-management, its security,
and protection can help to ensure security and privacy
for devices. Credential management prevents access to
sensitive data and keys which are necessary for encryption
as well as securing the communication channels.
• Firmware security: It is desired at the developer level to
maintain the bug-free release of firmware. Thus, a strong
debugging and evaluation against known vulnerabilities
must be carried before supplying it to the users or even
assemblers.
• Device policy compliance: It is necessary that users
must comply with the policies laid for a particular
device and should not break the codes, which may allow
unauthorized applications to take control over a device.
Such a vulnerable device may expose the entire network
and it is the responsibility of the user to maintain the
functionality of the device within the laid guideless.
• Script disabling: Majority of developers have shifted
their focus on developing applications which do not
require client-side scripts. Thus, from futuristic developers,
preventing scripts can allow security against vulnerabilities
without affecting the services.
• Continuous application security: Identification of appli-
cation security must be followed by the release of the
security update or newer versions. Thus, continuous
monitoring of applications is required to prevent possible
vulnerabilities. Moreover, this is also an effective strategy
to prevent the possibilities of zero-day threats and attacks.
There are several studies that have been dedicated to vulnera-
bilities in M-IoT and can be followed from [68]–[75]. Based
on these, it becomes inevitably important to understand the
concept, issues, scope and strength of present state of security,
privacy and trust for smart M-IoT.
E. Security, Privacy, and Trust for smart M-IoT
Because of a difference in mode of deployment and applica-
bility, security, privacy, and trust of M-IoT devices are of utmost
importance. These differences in the characteristics of involved
devices raise an alarming factor for securing and isolating each
user’s operations as the variation in behavior and operations
of each device may lead to different kind of threats based on
8their specifications [76]. Thus, it is important to study all the
aspects related to the security, privacy, and trust of smart M-
IoT networks. Majority of the threats occur due to inadequate
configurations of security properties and some of them are the
vulnerabilities that remain undetected over a course of time
due to the negligence of their developers [77] [78]. Minimizing
data acquisition, supporting M2M routing, resolving hidden
terminals and encryption can help to secure and privatize each
user’s data and information.
F. Methodologies for Analyses of Security, Privacy, and Trust
in Smart M-IoT
An approach is secure for the time being it is not broken,
which means security is difficult to analyze as there are no
direct simulators and emulators to be used for evaluation of a
system for these requirements. Visualization is another big
issue for such requirements. Visualization of trust can be
obtained as it is comparatively easier to define trust as a
metric between the communicating entities; whereas security
and privacy are governed by rules and policies which can
only be evaluated in an attacker environment. Creation and
demonstration of such an environment are difficult as it requires
a lot of automation, which is not applicable to most of
the available tools. Majority of the solutions are formally
analyzed using BurrowsAbadiNeedham (BAN) logic, which
is operated on belief theory [102] [103]. Some approaches
follow reduction techniques, while others simply rely on
evaluating the computational cost of operations. Apart from
these, some other methods include formal semantic evaluations,
equational theory, etc [104]. Cryptographic solutions can be
evaluated using random oracle model, inductive methods,
provable security, etc [105]–[107]. Model checking and theory
of proving are used by some approaches for evaluating
the flow of their solution. There are certain tools available
which can be used for these evaluations like, Automated
Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications
(AVISPA), A Computational Logic for Applicative Common
Lisp (ACL2), ProVerif, Scyther, etc [108]–[111]. Irrespective
of these evaluations, it is recommended that solutions should
conduct certain case studies while presenting outputs of their
proposed schemes and should demonstrate the effects on the
performance of the system and the network.
IV. SECURE FRAMEWORKS FOR SMART M-IOT
M-IoT networks are vulnerable to a different set of attacks
which can be launched due to improper configurations and
deployment strategies. It is required that these networks are
deployed with ultra-reliable formations, which help to hinder
launching of any unknown as well as known attacks. Further,
security implications, assessment, and threat modeling can
help to identify any such possibilities at a prior, which may
support prevention against intruders during the operations of
IoT devices [112] [113] [114]. Siboni et al. [115] highlighted
the importance of a framework for securing the content in
wearable IoT devices, which are considered as an important
part of M-IoT systems. The authors developed an innovative
testbed setup for evaluating the security policies of dynamic IoT
devices. The need of the hour is to provide such a framework
that can be used for supporting the security requirements
of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) that heavily rely on M-
IoT devices for their regular operations [116]. Authorization,
privacy as well as physical security and anonymity should be
the core aspect of frameworks, which primarily focus on the
security of smart M-IoT networks [117] [118]. Although the
existing frameworks provide a base for network formations,
these have to be operated with a different set of schemes,
protocols, as well as policy-mechanisms for a fully-reliable
and secure network establishment.
The smart frameworks should also support the cryptic
techniques, that can be built into its system through separate
modules [119] [120] [121]. Deployment of M-IoT through
SDNs and use of smart IDS are the future aims of the present
systems, which tend to facilitate the security of applications
operating over low-powered devices [122] [123]. Use of newer
concepts, such as fog architecture, Internet of drones, catalytic
computing and osmotic computing, can be considered as a
base for developing frameworks that can sustain the burden of
security as well as the performance at the same time [124]–
[128]. Based on the security requirements, a taxonomy is
presented which classifies the security frameworks for smart
M-IoT, as shown in Fig. 8. The details of these classifications
are presented below:
A. Access Control and Authorization-based Framework
The security of devices in M-IoT is subject to the man-
agement of accessibility and authorization for using particular
services as well as personal data. This type of frameworks helps
to limit the control over the usability of network components
and provides strong mechanisms for securing the users. The
strength of its security lies in the novelty of architecture used
for supporting convergence services to M-IoT users. There
are some works in this direction, which highlights the main
features of access control and management along with user and
service authorizations. However, the majority of them operates
on general IoT scenario and lacks evidential commitment on
their applicability to smart M-IoT scenarios. The access control
and authorization-based frameworks can be further classified
into three main types as shown below:
• Policy/Rule-based: The main aspects of such type include
user authentication, device authentication, resource autho-
rization, Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) access
control and etc. The solutions in this direction focus on
acquisition and control over services and user modules to
infrastructure security of its network. The main property
of this type is the formation of governing conditions, on
the basis of which, certain rules and policies are defined
for securing the users and services. Solutions in [79]–[84]
focus on providing frameworks which utilize user and
device authentication through policy and rules over device
operations in different network setups.
• Behaviour-based: This type of access control and autho-
rization depends on the mode of the user’s interaction with
other users and entities in the network. The operational
activity of the users is taken into account for access control
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Fig. 8. A broad classification of the security framework for smart M-IoT. The security approaches focusing on the frameworks for M-IoT can be broadly
classified on the basis of Access control and Authorization, Risk-Assessment features, Authentication, Secure Services, and Anomaly Detection.
and defining conditions of authorization for demanded
services. Such types of security frameworks are well suited
for modern services such as smart building, smart cities,
and smart factory [85], [86].
• Hybrid: There are certain solutions for access control
and authorization, which form policies or rules by using
behavioral aspects of the network entities to ensure its
security and continuity in operations. Such types of
frameworks are termed as hybrid access control and
authorization-based frameworks. Credential-based services
and intelligent solutions use such kind of mechanism for
ensuring security in a network [87], [88].
B. Risk-Assessment-based Framework
Identification of potential conflicting components and users
through detection modeling is mainly studied under risk-
assessment-based frameworks for security in smart M-IoT. Such
kind of frameworks helps to pre-identify any potential risks
involved in leveraging services through a particular aspect of
the network. These aspects may include situational awareness
of every involved entity of the network. Based on the mode of
identification, risk-assessment-based frameworks can be further
classified into three main types as shown below:
• Prediction-based: The Framework which identifies and
manages risk through predictive or estimated evaluations
of the network components are termed as prediction-based
risk assessment frameworks [89]. Such type of frameworks
considers prior and current states to identify the mode
of operations and uses decision modeling to arrive at a
decision of potential risks in the network.
• Probability-based: In probabilistic-based, the network is
evaluated for different kind of operations which are
executed over a period of time. Then, each process is
operated with a probabilistic model which then helps
to finalize the probabilistic cost of the networks, while
providing knowledge about the factors which dominates
the most and can affect the performance as well as security
policies. The most common aspect of such frameworks
is to identify attack success possibilities in a network
while using parameters like false positives, false negatives,
accuracy, recall, and precision as considered in [90], [91].
• Standard-based: Most of the organizations have a pre-
defined set of conditions which are to be fulfilled by
every framework which aims to provide a special kind of
services to its users. Majority of these conditions are the
benchmark and supported by standards organizations such
as International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE),
International Telecommunications Union (ITU). These
organizations provide guidelines for every framework to
justify its security considerations for the defined services.
One of the examples can be the forensic study of a
framework for its applicability to support on-demand
services to the mobile users [92].
C. Authentication-based Framework
Authentication of the users and devices in smart M-IoT
is of utmost importance and highly crucial. It is required
that all the services are provided only to the users which
authenticates themselves with the security servers usually
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) in any
network. These security servers ensure the safety of other
legitimate and authenticated users by providing a secure
mode of communications. One of the crucial aspects of
authentication is the positioning of authentication-server along
with the number of passes required to reach it. The mode of
authentication is quite vast, but for smart M-IoT, it can be
classified into primary mode of authentication, the secondary
mode of authentication and group-authentication. The choice
among each of them depends on the types of device, network
architecture and types of services to be supported by the
involved entities. The details on each of them are provided
below:
• Primary: The authentication which is performed with the
core of any network while using the secure channels
between the entity and the authentication server is known
as primary mode [93], [94]. Such kind of authentication
is much secure but often suffers from the consequences
of long paths and requirements of route optimizations.
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Despite its advantage of providing robust security, it often
causes additional overheads if each time an entity has to
be authenticated through it even in the cases it is always
present in the perimeter of the same network. However,
the majority of existing solutions prefer a primary mode
of authentication because of the ease of deployment and
maintenance.
• Secondary: Usually, networks which have data to be
constrained in a particular periphery or premises opt for
the secondary mode of authentication. Such a model is
responsible for securing a particular set of nodes which are
entitled to communication within the zone of the secondary
authentication server [95]. Secondary authentication also
uses an initial primary authentication for registering its
services and users to the core of the network and after
initial phases, all the security concerns are managed by it.
With the evolution of smart networks, it is preferred to
use a hybrid mechanism as it helps to provide a flexible
as well as robust security that too with lower overheads.
• Grouped: Another mode of authentication can be the
group authentication, which entitles similar entities to
be authenticated as a group through a common gateway.
Group authentication depends on the type of devices
involved in a group, and procedure of authentication
depends on their type. Some groups with highly crucial
devices may involve strong authentication while the
ones with limited resources may require light-weight
authentications so as to prevent any excessive utilization
of their resources [91].
D. Secure Services-based Framework
Type of services affects the security of a network. Some
services may require light-frameworks which are easy on
resources while others may require fast processing frameworks
which operate with lesser delays and fewer overheads. Such
type of frameworks is usually related to the authentication
facilities supported for managing the security of the network
as the authentication phase is itself responsible for resource
consumption and delays. Based on the requirements of services,
these frameworks can be classified into time-bound, resource-
bound, and hybrid frameworks as explained below:
• Time-bound: The frameworks which operate with time
as a crucial entity in securing the services and the users
of a network are studied as a time-bound services-based
framework. As studied in [86], [96], such frameworks are
lightweight and highly fast in processing and evaluation
of security policies. Usually, such frameworks perform
periodic evaluations on the time consumed in authen-
ticating users and allocating communication uplink for
data transmissions. Evaluation time, discovery time, and
authentication time are the crucial parameters in time-
bound security frameworks.
• Resource-bound: Most of the devices in smart M-IoT are
low on resources and suffer from the threat of average
lifetime. Usually, their lifetime is driven by the energy
and memory consumed by the services operational on
each device and often the mandatory services consume
the majority of their services [80], [83], [97]. Thus, it
becomes important to develop frameworks which focus on
the security while keeping a control on the utilization of
M-IoT resources with a limited burden on the operational
control and activity of the device. Such type of frameworks
uses checkpoint mechanism to manage the resource
consumption for the security of M-IoT applications.
• Hybrid: Nowadays, the smart applications tend to be
time-bound as well as resource-bound. Thus, there is
a requirement of frameworks which can apply both
these features while forming a hybrid services-based
framework that can use both the resource-checkpoints as
well as periodic evaluation of security policies for securing
activities in smart M-IoT. Accessibility and response time
can be considered as mutual parameters for accessing the
performance of such frameworks [85].
E. Anomaly Detection-based Framework
Identification of false users, false services and false entities
in a network is studied under this category. It is a responsibility
of security framework to identify communities and users which
pose potential risks to legitimate users of the network. Further,
such a classification helps to manage the flow of information as
well as limit the accessibility of users with harmful properties
and high risks to network services. Anomaly detections are
performed by checking the correctness of a device or user
against the predefined policies of accurate operations. On a
broader side, such frameworks can be classified into on-site
and off-site evaluators with the description as given below:
• On-site: The real-time evaluation of the users for legitimate
and accurate operations is classified as on-site or real-time
anomaly detection. Such type of detections is performed
by deploying real-time Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
which dedicated sniffs the traffic without breaking its flow
and without any excessive overheads [98]–[100]. Majority
of evaluations are conducted through sandboxes which do
not reveal their identity to the users and prohibits anomaly
users from accessing the services across the network.
• Off-site: In some cases, real-time evaluations may pose
an excessive burden on the network and it is difficult to
analyze the high flow of data. Such networks are evaluated
off-site at their respective data centers which check for
the presence of any abnormal activity for each of its users.
Usually, such type is suitable for scenarios which allow
delayed transactions without affecting the services such
as payment gateways or smart-phone updates [46], [99],
[101].
In addition to above, anomaly detections can be classified as
periodic or continuous depending on the time and procedure
of detection.
F. Summary and Insights
In this section, we have summarized different types of
frameworks, which help to secure the operations as well as
the network layout of smart M-IoT. The summarized study
divides the existing solutions into five broad categories and
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Fig. 9. A broad classification of secure protocols in smart M-IoT. The existing solutions can be classified into secure routing, authentication mode and
hierarchy, and property-based secure protocols.
considering their evaluation metrics and ideologies, a state-of-
the-art comparison is presented in Appendix.Table VI, which
compares the key IoT frameworks with specification on smart
mobile network formations. The table helps to understand the
reachability of each approach and their primary application
of interest. These comparisons can be used for understanding
what has been attained so far and what are the directions yet
to be focused while securing applications in smart M-IoT net-
works. Hybridizing network layouts with security policies and
involving vulnerability assessments can be used for developing
security middleware for smart M-IoT applications. As discussed
in [79], [80], security resources, user authentication, device
authentication, resource utilization and data investigations
should be included while developing frameworks for securing
smart M-IoT. There are many solutions, which only relies on
CoAP, but it is desired to make strategic shifts for enhancing
the security of devices and users against known as well as
unknown cyber threats.
V. SECURITY-AWARE PROTOCOLS FOR SMART M-IOT
It is to be considered that with the introduction of new
technologies for communications, the links between the M-IoT
devices have grown up to many Gigabits, which means the
window to perform security operations has further decreased,
and it is extremely challenging for the researchers to accommo-
date existing security policies in such a short timing window.
Thus, protocols for M-IoT security are yet to be revolutionized
on the basis of their applicability and reachability for M-IoT
applications.
Security protocols prevent unauthorized attempts for using
resources or data in a defined network [27] [158]. Commu-
nications in M-IoT are usually handled by the dissemination
protocols like CoAP, Advanced Message Queuing Protocol
(AMQP), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT),
Domain Name Server-Service Discovery (DNS-SD), etc [159],
whereas security is supported either by enhancing the features
of these protocols; or by using existing security protocols
with the routing schemes; or by designing novel security
and communication schemes which are usually specific to
applications [160] [161]. Such solutions may operate well in
one scenario and may fall prey to different types of attacks if
their application area is changed.
The success of the security protocols is affected by the
compliance degree of a user with the recommended set-
tings [162] [163]. It is required that security protocols should
not affect the performance and their operations (like encryption
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and decryption) should be completed without many overheads.
Protection of Peer to Peer (P2P) and Peer to Multi-Peer
(P2MP) links is one of the major challenges while designing
protocols for the security of M-IoT. Protocols can be protected
either by following asymmetric mode or symmetric mode
in their key operations. The location of AAA server and its
optimized placement are other issues to be resolved in M-IoT.
Moreover, Route optimizations are additional concerns which
have to be taken care by the security protocols.
Previously known protocols, like Secure File Transfer Pro-
tocol (SFTP), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Hypertext Transfer
Protocol Secure (HTTPS), Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), can
be adopted for network security while authentication can be gov-
erned by Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) as it is one
of the standard protocols used for security in 3G. Some other
crucial protocols include Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP), Remote Access Dial In User Service (RADIUS), DIAM-
ETER, Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Ac-
cess (PANA), Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol
(LEAP), Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP),
etc. EAP is further facilitated with suitable extensions as AKA,
AKA-prime (AKA’), Transport Layer Security (TLS), Message
Digest-5 (MD5), Tunneled Transport Layer Security (TTLS),
Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE), Generic Token Card (GTC),
Pre-Shared Key (PSK), Password (PWD), etc [164] [165].
Handover protection is also related to the protocols as these
are identified as a crucial part of security in M-IoT. Majority
of them use EAP-based authentication (EAP-TLS). Some of
the key contributions on handover security include Security
Protocol for Fast PMIPv6 (SPFP), Handover Optimized Ticket-
based Authentication (HOTA), Ticket-based authentication
(TA), Secure Password Authentication Mechanism (SPAM),
etc [140].
The security protocols in smart M-IoT can be studied by
classifying them into routing-based, authentication-mode based,
authentication-hierarchy-based, and property-based mecha-
nisms, as shown in Fig. 9. The details are as follows:
A. Secure routing-based
There are a plethora of solutions, which focus on providing
secure routing for smart M-IoT applications. The routing
schemes which are available for general networks, be it reactive
or proactive, holds true for smart M-IoT setups. Existing
routing mechanisms can be used while leveraging the security
guidelines to secure the communications between the M-IoT
users. From a broader point of view, the secure routing-based
protocols can be classified into following types:
• Route Optimization (RO)-based relaying: Finding shortest
paths and reducing the path of authentication can be
attained through optimized relaying in the networks. Such
RO-based relaying often removes dependencies from
the intermediate entities to provide low-overhead based
solutions for security [129].
• Trust-based relaying: Finding nodes on the basis of trust
calculations and using them for transmissions are another
kind of security protocols. Such protocols use trust as a
weighted metric for calculating paths between the users
in M-IoT [130].
• Cluster-based relaying: In some scenarios, network entities
operate in a group while depending on a core entity which
acts as their head leading to the formation of multiple
clusters in the network. There are certain routing protocols
which aim to support the security of communication
between the cluster heads allowing secure relaying be-
tween the nodes with lesser overheads and computational
complexity [131]. Clustering is effective in case the
protocols depend on group-based authentication, however,
in primary and secondary modes of authentication, it may
cause excessive overheads.
• Secure-Medium Access Control (MAC) based relaying:
Control over timing policies and accessibility of user
operations lead to the requirements of a secure MAC
based relaying for users in smart M-IoT. Such relaying
protocols use command over congestion window and
packet forwarding policies to control the flow of packets
as well as uses cryptographic solutions for securing its
relaying procedures [132], [133].
• Cross-layer-based relaying: Secure routing can be obtained
over the network layer while obtaining properties from
other layers such as the transport layer or the MAC layer.
The protocols on the network layer use parameters like
Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) and use it as a
weighted condition to select nodes in smart M-IoT [134]–
[136]. Such a relaying can be effective in scenarios where
the resources are limited and the lifetime of the network
is of utmost importance.
• Topology-based relaying: Identification of nodes on the
basis of their location and checking the path of authen-
tication before transmissions lead to the formation of
secure topology-based routing [137]. Such protocols are
effective where the dynamic nature of nodes is crucial
and often changes. However, it is difficult to control such
scenario and topology-aware relaying is often combined
with mobility-management procedures for attaining a
secure and fast relaying.
• IP-based relaying: This is the core relaying mechanism for
the majority of the mobile applications as it uses Mobile
IPv6 (MIPv6) and Fast Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6) procedures
to support the selection of nodes. Further, the security
in such protocols is provided by proxy-mechanisms and
can be seen in various proxy-based protocols such as
Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) and F-PMIPv6 [138]–[140].
Such relaying solutions can be combined with media in-
dependent schemes to form Media Independent Handover
(MIH)-PMIPv6 relaying with specific implementation over
smart M-IoT applications.
• Mobility-based relaying: Mobility management is often
studied as a part of handovers; however, existing routing
schemes can be classified on the basis of mobility
management. Such schemes are responsible for securing
the path of the nodes when they are moving in an intra-
or inter-mode of a given authentication server. Mobility
management schemes can be studied as distributed, cen-
tralized, semi-distributed or even hierarchical [129], [141],
[142].
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B. Authentication mode-based
Similar to authentication-based frameworks, authentication
protocols allow identification of legitimate users which can
interact with each other for acquiring particular services over
the network. Authentication protocols help to validate the users
for transmissions in M-IoT. The vulnerability and importance
of M-IoT demand the employment of exceedingly reliable
methods in the design of secure systems. Authentication
protocols are one of the most important design parameters.
These protocols help to achieve a reliable trust and security
for exchange information. On the basis of mode of operations,
the authentication protocols can be classified into following
two types:
• Proactive: Authentication protocols which focus on pre-
verification of the users before beginning the transmissions
are termed as proactive authentication [140], [141], [143].
Such schemes are highly reliable but sometimes slower in
operations. Thus, these are often the primary preference
of setups that focus on the services over smart M-IoT.
• Reactive: Authentication protocols which focus on the
on-demand verification of the users and support a direct
linking between the network users are termed as reactive
authentication [144]. Reactive authentication is fast in
operations, but is usually, vulnerable to a lot of network
attacks which raises a question about their secure usability
for smart M-IoT. However, with modern solutions like
crowdsourcing and blockchains, reactive protocols can
easily be extended and secure for their usability in smart
M-IoT setups.
C. Authentication hierarchy-based
Authentication involves multiple entities which secure them-
selves by verifying each other either directly or through an
Authentication Server (AS). On the basis of operations and
hierarchy, authentication protocols can be classified into one-
way or two-way authentication based protocols.
• One-way authentication: One-way authentication involves
user-side verification with respect to the rules provided by
the governing server (AAA or AS) [145]. The genuineness
of the users is proved by the properties which are only
shared by the user itself.
• Two-way authentication: Two-way authentication involves
both user-sides as well as server-side verifications [146],
[147]. The genuineness of the users, as well as the servers,
is proved through their respective properties which are
shared amongst them. Two-way authentication can further
be extended into different modes of handshakes depending
on the level of security to be verified before beginning
the transmissions.
D. Property-based
Security protocols can also be classified on the basis of
properties which are used for securing the transmissions
between the nodes. Based on some key requirements, the
security protocols can be categorized on the basis of following
properties:
• Freshness-based: Freshness means that messages ex-
changed in a session are generated specifically for a
particular session. The attacker cannot use the previous
session for messages. Freshness based protocols are used
for communication between the two parties by establishing
a secure channel on the basis of the freshness of sessions.
The receiver believes that the obtained information is fresh
and authenticated. Freshness is achieved by updating keys
and sessions through consistent changes in parameters like
seeds, nonce and sequence numbers of involved entities
in smart M-IoT. Approaches based on freshness of keys
and sessions are discussed in [129], [139], [147]–[153].
• Encryption-based: Encryption is an interesting piece of
technology that works by scrambling data or information
so it is unreadable by attackers. Encryption is a key-
based approach to combine confidentiality and integrity,
and provides a secure mechanism against external threats
such as chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks.
Encryption based protocol ensure the confidentiality
of sharing information between the users in smart M-
IoT [129], [137], [139], [146], [147], [149]–[157].
• Access-based: Limiting the users from accessing a par-
ticular service is one of the key requirements of smart
M-IoT applications. Protocols which can help to define
role to every user and control their activity are classified
into access-based security protocols. There are a lot of
existing solutions, which aim at enhancing the security
of the mobile network by limiting the user operations
while using the policies for information flow, management,
and control [129], [146], [147], [149]–[157]. A highly
stabilized access control protocol can prevent misleading
or eavesdropper from gaining access to crucial information
in smart M-IoT.
• System Integrity-based: System integrity protection is
a necessary step to ensure a high level of security. As
discussed in [115], [139], [146], [147], [149], [152],
[156], [157], development of system integrity protection
protocols can help to manage information disturbances
and prevent attacks. The involved parties in smart M-
IoT setups want to assure that all the remote data they
receive is from systems that satisfy the users’ integrity
requirements. Therefore, it is important that system
integrity based protocols can protect the information
results from being polluted by attackers.
E. Summary and Insights
In this section, we presented a detailed study on security-
aware protocols for smart M-IoT. Following the above-
discussed classification, some major contributions to security
protocols which are applicable to M-IoT are highlighted in
Appendix.Table VII. The existing protocols are evaluated
on the basis of system integrity, freshness, confidentiality,
mutual authentication, access control, overheads, encryption,
and non-repudiation. Apart from these, several schemes can
be followed from SPORE [183], which is a repository of
security protocols.. Over the last decade, protocols have been
improvised by utilizing security as a crucial metric to decide a
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Fig. 10. A broad classification of privacy-preservation schemes for smart M-IoT. The existing solutions can be studied by classifying them into encryption-based,
architecture-based, protocol-based, and tool-based mechanisms for privacy preservation.
path; however, with the evolution of new CPS, dynamic nodes,
and energy-constraint mobile devices, this direction of research
remains open and require protocols, which can operate beyond
authentication.
Research can be extended towards the designing of a secure
protocol stack, which can include channel as well as message
protection without compromising the QoS to its users. Network
patrolling, perimeter evaluation, and deployment of intrusion
detection protocols can help to further secure the operations
of smart M-IoT.
VI. PRIVACY PRESERVATION APPROACHES FOR SMART
M-IOT
Data in M-IoT is highly crucial as well as sensitive and
any eavesdropping may result in leakage of users’ personal
information [184] [185]. With data processing reaching a fine
granularity level, it becomes tedious to privatize the content as
new issues arise because of many dependencies on the platform
used for transmissions. The collection and control of data are
two of the main reasons that increase threat-level for data
privacy in M-IoT [186] [187] [188]. With the difference in
architectural deployment, smart M-IoT possesses large-scale
implications for removing issues which may leak the entire
information of the networks. Most of the approaches fail to
support access control and authorization while deploying appli-
cations for smart M-IoT networks. Reducing the reachability
of every user and keeping a watch on the amount and level
of contents accessed by an individual can help in privacy-
preservation [189] [25] [190].
Encryption of data for every link can further help this
cause, however, with the networks attaining a high-speed
property, it becomes necessary to support both encryption and
decryption at a rapid pace [191]. Majority of the intermediate
procedures should be done on the cipher itself, as this will
help to prevent any unauthorized decryption of the text being
shared between M-IoT devices. Further, approaches can use
customized identifiers for creating policies for maintaining
the anonymity of access between its users. Along with these,
prevention of hidden terminals is another major requirement
for privacy-preservation [192]–[195].
Practical problems like network partitioning and isolations
increase the risks of leakage of data and it is necessary to
formulate approaches that can help to identify such issues
before-hand and with low-complexity [196]–[200]. Data privacy
can be guaranteed by using solutions, which prevent sniffing
and do not yield any information even if discovered by
intermediates [201] [202] [203]. This can be further enhanced
by using non-store approach, which refers to the immediate
forwarding of the data without consuming the excessive time
stamp as well as keeping the freshness of the keys. Privacy can
further be assured by preventing third party-based evaluations
as these may disclose the encryption mechanisms of the entire
route as well as of the traffic [204].
Distribution of incoming traffic not only prevents DoS or
DDoS but also helps to make sure about the identification of any
eavesdropper that may be listening to the incoming or outgoing
traffic [205] [206]. Updating security policies, maintenance of
logs and refining network architecture at regular intervals for
the detected traffic and anomalies can further help in privacy-
preservation of M-IoT networks [207]. Some of the major
contributions on data privacy in IoT, which are applicable
to M-IoT architecture, are discussed in Appendix.Table VIII.
These schemes can be further classified into four major types,
encryption-based, architecture-based, protocol-based and tool-
based privacy preservation, as shown in Fig. 10. The details
of each of these are provided below:
A. Encryption-based
Privacy is mainly the protection of personal information of
users and devices in smart M-IoT. Disclosure of information
can be protected through encryption of data which prohibits
any eavesdropper from obtaining any knowledge even if he or
she is able to capture the majority of its parts. Encryption-based
schemes are not different from usual encryption algorithms.
Thus, the existing solutions can be classified into traditional
encryption schemes on the basis of algorithm or mechanism
used by them for protecting the data. These types are as follows:
15
• Symmetric encryption: The symmetric key encryption
relies on the same key for encryption and decryption i.e.
the key used for the encryption and the decryption should
be same at both the parties. Symmetric-key encryption
is essentially the same as a secret code that each of the
two entities must know in order to encrypt and decrypt
information. The symmetric key encryption has the major
problem of exchange overheads of keys between the two
parties, especially with maintaining trust when encryption
is used for authentication and integrity checking [169].
• Asymmetric encryption: Asymmetrical encryption is also
known as public key cryptography, uses two keys to
encrypt or decrypt of a plain text. The secret keys are
exchanged over the Internet or a large network. The
message encrypted by a public key can only be decrypted
using a private key and similarly, data encrypted using a
private key can only be decrypted using a public key [170]–
[177]. Asymmetric encryption is far better in ensuring the
security of information transmitted during communication.
• Homomorphic encryptions: Homomorphic encryptions
allow complex mathematical operations to be performed
on encrypted data without compromising the encryption.
The encrypted data set is transformed into another data
set by preserving relationships between elements in both
sets. Studies conducted on the topic of Homomorphic
encryption in [178]–[180] highlight their applicability
over the smart M-IoT.
B. Architecture-based
Privacy preservation schemes can also be marked on the basis
of architecture used for deployment and operations. Generally,
the existing solutions depend on a centralized mechanism, but
with solutions like blockchain which primarily uses public key
operations, the architectural deployments become distributed.
• Centralized: Approaches which use a controller or cen-
tralized entity as a key enabler for privacy-preservation
are studied in this type. Centralized solutions are effective
from the monitoring perspective, but these pose a threat
to a single point of failure which is difficult to sustain
for any network [181]. Especially, in smart M-IoT, if
all the traffic is regulated by the centralized authority,
it becomes necessary to develop schemes which will
define the policies of load management as well as prevent
excessive utilization of resources for the traffic coming
from a single source.
• Distributed: Such schemes depend on the distributed and
flat nature of architectures and prevent a common point of
failure as privacy preservation is initiated by the user or a
node which are abstracted from other components of the
network. In some scenarios, multiple nodes are used for
defining policies for privacy preservation. However, the
success of such approaches depends on their compliance
degree and synergy in supporting common algorithms for
a large set of nodes [166] [182].
C. Protocol-based
As discussed in the protocol section, privacy can be supported
by defining rules which are operated as a part of conditions and
help to decide on the sharing of information between the users.
Protocol-based privacy is easier to achieve and an efficient way
for networks that operate in close proximity to each other [154],
[166]. Such schemes are extremely useful for networks using
crowdsourcing and can be used as broadcast mechanisms for
blockchain-based distributed solutions for privacy preservations.
D. Tool-based
Such an approach is easier to manage as it only involves
process like masking, tagging or user-controlled policies [130],
[167], [168]. Tool-based privacy is governed by the properties
and services offered by the application platforms running for
smart M-IoT. However, the correctness of such solutions is
dependent on the legitimacy of the service providers and
their honesty which cannot be measured through any tool
and depends on the level of commitment to their users.
E. Summary and Insights
In this section, we summarized the privacy-preservation
approaches for smart M-IoT on the basis of encryption, archi-
tecture, protocols, and tools. Data privacy is achievable through
message protection and protocols can be used for authorizing
applications and users before accessing personalized data of
the smart M-IoT owner. Privacy can be attained through novel
security protocols as well as positioning of AAA that can
ensure the end to end data privacy.
Policy-based, identity-based, ID-based, attribute-based en-
cryptions and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be the major
enables for privacy preservation. Solutions, like blockchain
and tangle (directed acyclic graph), can be used for preserving
privacy through transactions between smart M-IoT users. The
choice of encryption plays a key role as it affects the policies
of session management between end to end devices based on
the factors like freshness, integrity and perfect forward secrecy,
which are attainable through secure key operations. More
advances are expected in tool-based privacy preservation as
well as personalized management as users are becoming much
aware and demand personalized settings for each operation.
VII. TRUST MANAGEMENT APPROACHES FOR SMART
M-IOT
M-IoT aims at maintaining a secure relationship between
the entities involved in service provisioning as well as data
dissemination [229] [230]. Most of the trust-enabled networks
establish a reputation system based on a centralized entity that
can help to check whether a particular node in the network
can be relied upon or not. Such evaluations of reliability are
an integral part of trust management systems [231]. With a
billion of devices, the complexity of maintaining trust increases
and it becomes relatively difficult to handle such an enormous
number of devices, which leads the network into attacks by
false reputation enhancement of an intruder [232].
Most of the trust management systems are governed by
policies which are decided on the basis of the configurations of
the network as well as the types of services supported by the
M-IoT devices [233]. Trust management depends heavily on
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Fig. 11. A broad classification of trust-management schemes for smart M-IoT. The existing solutions can be studied by classifying them into architecture-based,
property-based, decision-based, and IDS-based trust management in smart M-IoT.
the distributed computations as slow computations may cause
excessive overheads which are a hazard for secure systems.
Crowdsourcing, computational offloading, dividing of service
accessibility, distributed policy formations, distributed trust
maintenance, and D2D computations, help in reducing the
overheads and complexities associated with the building of trust-
relaying systems for M-IoT [234]–[237]. Trust-based solutions
for smart M-IoT can be classified into following types, as
shown in Fig. 11:
A. Architecture-based
Trust in smart M-IoT is attainable through a unique imple-
mentation of architecture while placing each entity in such
a way that it provides a pathway for believing each other
before communications. On the basis of architectural setup,
trust management approaches can be classified into following
three types:
• Centralized: It constitutes an entity which is present at
the center of a given network and is responsible for
handling trust computations for the entire network [208].
The problem with such a deployment is the risk of single
point of failure.
• Distributed: It constitutes trust evaluation through dis-
tributed entities which prevent a single point of failure.
Distributed trusts are usually operated as P2P or P2MP,
but not peer to all [209].
• Hierarchical: It constitutes calculations by using a layered
architecture which focuses on evaluating trust for entities
on each layer [130], [210], [211]. This allows selection
of accurate nodes in the next order of hierarchy.
B. Decision-based
Trust is a decision-based entity, which in some cases is
marked by following certain principles of communications.
Node management and selection of next hop are two of the
examples of decision-based trust management. On the basis of
ideology, decision-based trust management can be categorized
into following two types:
• Policy-based: Using conditions to take a decision on the
situation of entities is treated as a policy-based solution.
The policy-based approach often results in a centralized
or hierarchical solution as a governing body is required
to form the policies for evaluating trust of the involved
entities in smart M-IoT [212], [213].
• Rule-based: Using conditions to evaluate given informa-
tion for generating relevant knowledge regarding the trust
of an entity is treated as a rule-based solution. The rule-
based approach utilizes any type of architecture; however,
it always has dominance for deciding rules or a consensus
model for arriving at a common decision while formulating
principles of trust evaluations [214], [215].
C. Property-based
Trust is itself a property of a device in smart M-IoT. However,
this core property can be classified into sub-categories through
which trust can be ensured in any type of network as explained
below:
• Reputation-based: Reputation is a fundamental concept
in several situations which can be involved in the inter-
action between mutually distrusting parties [216], [217].
Reputation-based trust relies on a “soft computational”
approach to formulate the problem of trust. The trust
systems rely on the basic idea of analyses and combination
of paths and networks of trust relationships. Trust and rep-
utation systems play a significant role in decision support
for Internet-mediated service provisioning. Reputation-
based trust management helps to mitigate the security
complications of smart M-IoT [218].
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• Behaviour-based: Behaviour-based trust models include a
fixed evaluation scheme. The scheme uses the knowledge
of behaviour in previous interactions and derives the
trustworthiness of an entity [219], [220]. The behaviour-
specific knowledge can be obtained from the feedbacks
and recommendations.
• Heuristics based: Heuristics are used to aid the decision or
estimation process by evaluating indirect trust of an agent
into the direct trust estimation. The decision formulation is
handled with the estimation through metrics [221], [222].
• Pattern-based: A set of design patterns are used for design-
ing systems with the explicit intention of increasing trust
between entities. The behavioural patterns are followed
to achieve a sustainable trust. Patterns are used to solve
recurring problems in trust-based communications for
smart M-IoT. Patterns have been developed in a range of
disciplines for a variety of domains to make a trust model.
The patterns can be obtained by behaviour, rules, policy,
flow etc [223].
• Anomaly detection based: The anomalies are abnormal be-
havior which is intended to affect the systems. Anomalies
can be detected based on their own signatures and settings.
The rules and threat modeling can be done with the help of
system behaviors and signatures. Anomalies are inspected
over the high malicious network traffic to improve the
detection accuracy of trust model [224], [225]. Signature-
based IDS are the well-known anomaly detection systems
in smart M-IoT networks.
• Hybrid: Such a trust management system which combines
all the above-discussed solutions as a single mechanism
is a part of hybrid trust management in smart M-IoT.
Hybrid approaches use all the existing property-based
approaches and choose the one which suits best to the
given conditions and configurations [226].
D. Third party-based
Depending on external mode for calculating trust is one
of the prominent solutions of modern day networks. Such
a solution uses mechanisms like deep learning, data analytic,
neural networks or AI for evaluating the trust of communicating
entities. Based on the outputs from third-party evaluations, there
can be two main types:
• Certificate-based: Providing certificate of assurance on
successful evaluation of required trust is easier and a
comprehensive solution, which is also capable of providing
a detailed report on the operations of a device [227], [228].
Third parties use certain policies, cookies, and cached
entries to ensure trust while generating certificates for the
required device in a smart M-IoT.
• Rating-based: In certain scenarios, third parties are in-
volved in giving ranking or ratings to each individual
involved in the formation of the network. Such an approach
is termed as rating-based trust management. A threshold is
marked on the basis of some predetermined score and each
entity is evaluated against this threshold value [217] [130].
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Fig. 12. A broad classification of secure physical layer schemes for smart
M-IoT. The existing solutions can be classified into service-based and channel
based mechanisms.
E. Summary and Insights
In this section, we provided a detailed classification of trust
management approaches for smart M-IoT. Trust relationships
not only secure the M-IoT but also help in building reliable
CPS. Evaluation of trust by using a limited set of metrics is
a challenge for M-IoT, however, such a system offers huge
scalability and can be operated with less management and
better control [28]. Incorporation of software security, privacy
control, and security constraints further strengthen the trust
modeling in M-IoT. Along with these, trust-based solutions
can be modeled into secure communication systems through
security protocols, which use encryption policies for defining
new security schemes by using a similar model of trust-relaying
systems [238] [31] [239].
To summarize, a detailed state-of-the-art comparative study
on various trust management schemes is presented in Ap-
pendix.Table IX, which can be extended for their use in the
smart M-IoT environment. The table helps to understand the
key features and parameters focused by most of the existing
solutions along with their core ideology for maintaining trust
between the IoT entities.
VIII. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY FOR SMART M-IOT
Unlike traditional security solutions, which focus on the
logical aspects of the networks, physical security is hardest
and difficult to follow because of a difference in the type
and make of an M-IoT device. With each device following
a different set of parameters and configurations, it becomes
difficult to provide a common solution which can withstand
the Channel State Information (CSI) requirements of the
entire network while securing the physical transmission of the
network [254] [255] [256]. Network coding and multiplexing
approaches usually rely on cryptographic solutions only to
reduce the complexity of physical layer; however, this makes
the system vulnerable to different types of attacks that can
be launched over the used mechanisms. With devices being
operated on battery, physical layer security becomes far more
challenging and should be attained with lesser overheads as
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well as a lesser number of computations. A highly burdened
operation may deplete the energy resources and an operational
M-IoT network becomes of no use. The types of technology,
3G, 4G/LTE or upcoming 5G, play a crucial role in selecting an
approach that can fit into the physical configurations as well as
can support the load at a dedicated frame size [255] [257] [258].
Designing of security schemes on the physical layer may
seem to be difficult, but it provides all set of new opportunities
for improving the QoS as well as QoE for the end-users.
The strength of the physical layer security depends on the
adversary model which is used for evaluating the developed
solution [254] [259]. Such solutions are usually driven by the
assumptions of the CSI as well as device type and may or
may not stand once new vulnerabilities are discovered over a
course of time [260] [261] [262]. The existing solutions can be
broadly classified into two main types, service-based physical
layer security, and channel-based physical layer security, as
shown in Fig. 12. The details on both of these are presented
below:
A. Service-based
Physical layer security in smart M-IoT can be obtained
through service management, control over interference issues
and performing accessibility management. Based on the ser-
vices supported by the smart M-IoT, physical layer security
can be studied in three parts:
• Cryptographic: The solutions, which use cryptographic
mechanisms for preventing any eavesdropping, are studied
in this type. As discussed in [240], [241], these systems
combine physical layer properties with cryptographic
mechanisms to ensure the safety of communication
between the devices in M-IoT. Such a security is complex
to attain but powerful in applicability.
• Access Control and Transmissions: The solutions, which
control the signal possessions by the users as analyzed
in [242]–[246], are studied in this type. Access control and
transmission based solutions are generally low complex
and focus on interference management along with control
over secrecy probability.
• Jamming: There are certain solutions as provided in [247]–
[249], which prohibit users from unintentional uplink
or downlink in a specified zone. These approaches are
responsible for energy-efficient security at the physical
layer.
B. Channel-based
Physical layer solutions which emphasize the security of
channel used for communications are dependent on the signal
alterations and induction of bit codes into the transmission
medium. Such solutions should operate with a low-complexity
and their operations must be completed in few nanoseconds.
The success of these solutions depends on the type of
communication setup used for transmissions and the approaches
used for securing the bits. Based on the mode of operations,
these can be classified into modulation-based and encoding-
based solutions:
• Modulation-based: Such schemes changes the signal
properties (Amplitude, Phase, or Frequency) for preventing
any eavesdropping on the transmitted data. In general,
secure-spectrums can help to attain modulation-based
channel security in smart M-IoT. These solutions are
performed by using carrier waves [250] [251].
• Encoding-based: Using different codes for the security
algorithms at the physical layer helps to secure the
traffic and such an approach is classified into encoding
based solution. These are performed through binary
codes [252] [253].
C. Summary and Insights
In this section, we summarized the existing studies into two
main categories of physical-layer approaches namely, service-
based and channel-based solutions. These solutions were further
studies by classifying them on the basis of cryptographic
mechanism, access control and transmission policies, jamming
facilities, modulation, and encoding. From the study, it is
evident that channel estimation, M2M modeling, fading losses,
noisy models, energy-constraints are some of the crucial aspects
to be taken care of while deploying security solutions for
physical layer in M-IoT [275]–[278].
Physical security of the M-IoT network is also impacted by
the burden of devices and interference-management, which are
driven by the density of the network. Most of the physical layer
security solutions are driven by Signal-to-Interference Ratio
(SIR), Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR), secrecy,
outage policies, and transmit energies. Despite a plethora of
approaches for IoT’s physical layer security, there are only a
few solutions which can withstand the requirements of M-IoT;
thus, a comparison study is presented in Appendix.Table X,
which helps to understand the reach and level of security
provided by the existing solutions.
IX. HANDOVER SECURITY FOR SMART M-IOT
Handovers can be hard, soft, horizontal, vertical, terminal
and network controlled, and terminal and network initiated.
The handovers allow the shifting of radios between the same
or different media in a network. M-IoT devices undergo
handoffs once they leave their service-space and enter an area
governed by a different entity. Most of the handovers in M-
IoT are vertical that require efficient security measures for the
protection of links during their switching [279] [141] [280].
There is a huge requirement of trust as well as seamless
shifting of services across the terminals while performing
handoffs and mobility management in the network [281] [282].
Usually, the M-IoT networks focus on using an Access Point
(AP), M-IoT device, AS, and core terminals for shifting
services across the network [140]. Most of the networks
require seamless services and faster authentication which can be
obtained through proactive mechanisms [283]. These proactive
approaches define pre-determined system model over which
the authentication is performed and verified against the attacker
models. Most of the approaches are selected on the basis of
handoff latency, and time consumed in laying off their services
onto the next terminals along with their cost of operations [284].
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Fig. 13. A broad classification of secure handover schemes for smart M-IoT.
SDNs, media-independent technologies, network slicing and
the inclusion of PMIPv6-based solutions can enhance the
performance of security solutions that aim at securing the
handovers in M-IoT [129], [142], [285]–[288]. The proactive
and reactive handover authentication approaches can be further
classified into initiation-based, architecture-based, and property-
based schemes for security in smart M-IoT, as shown in Fig. 13.
Note that all of the handover authentication solutions may
either use primary, secondary or group mode for authentication
irrespective of the classification. The details on each of these
classifications are as follows:
A. Initiation-based
Handovers are operated through a governing entity which
initiates the procedures of attachment and detachment of a
node in the network. Based on the initiation, the handovers
authentication procedures can be divided into following two
types:
• Host-initiated: When the service consuming entity starts
the procedures of handovers, the type of handovers is
marked as host-initiated. Host-initiated handovers consume
much signaling and might have a weak security because
of a failure in the identification of requests which may
come from an anomaly node [263].
• Network-initiated: When the service providing entity starts
the procedures of handovers, the type of handovers is
marked as network-initiated. This type of handover is
low complex and more secure in because of control by
a centralized authority [264]. However, security layouts
and architectural complexity can affect the performance
of such handovers.
B. Architecture-based
As discussed earlier, the handovers authentication procedures
can also be studied from the architectural point of view and
can be distinguished into following two types:
• Centralized: This includes the authentication procedures,
which are driven by a centralized authority. SDN-based
or topology-based authentications are usually centralized
in nature and consequently pose a risk of single point
of failure [265]. Further, centralized layout increases the
security path, which requires RO approaches for increasing
the performance.
• Distributed: This includes solutions like blockchain-DMM,
P2P, P2MP and crowdsourcing like authentications which
can help to remove the dependencies on a single entity
in smart M-IoT [264], [266].
Moreover, location privacy is another factor to be considered
for mobility of M-IoT. It helps to maintain the anonymity of
user location and its specifications. Considering the inclusion
of location-based services in M-IoT, use of location-privacy
solutions helps to protect the system at the network as well
as the user’s end [289] [290] [291]. M-IoT can also be
facilitated by using location-privacy through obfuscation [292].
This will also allow the extension of M-IoT to opportunistic
scenarios. Liao et al. [293] developed a trajectory-protecting
solution, which supports location-based service privacy for IoT-
cloud systems. The authors rely on K-Anonymity Trajectory
(KAT) algorithm, which shows low complex simulated results.
Location-privacy can also be considered as an additional metric
for trust evaluation [294] [295]. Such solutions are facilitated
by hybrid security architectures and uses different algorithms
for different modules of the architecture.
With the involvement of crowdsources in M-IoT, location-
privacy is a dominant metric to be considered for protecting
location-based threats and prevent issues related to backward
broadcasting or tunneling [296] [297] [298]. Especially, for the
inclusion of such solutions to M-IoT, it is desired to developed
novel key distribution and credential management system that
can elongate the efforts for location-based privacy preservation.
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C. Property-based
Handover authentication mechanisms can be classified on the
basis of property which governs their security aspects. These
include
• IP-based: This includes authentication mechanisms fol-
lowed by the majority of mobile applications as it uses
proxy procedures to support the security of nodes in smart
M-IoT. PMIPv6 and F-PMIPv6 are among the popular
solutions for secure and seamless handovers [129], [140],
[267], [268].
• Reliability-based: Approaches like [141], [269], which not
only provides strong authentication but also supports the
reliability of connections, are studied under this category.
Such approaches help to sustain the connections for longer
durations without affecting compromising the security
considerations of the network.
• Encryption-based: Authentication solutions, which focus
on using encryption-based solutions for security, are
studied under this type. Encryption based handovers help
to protect the user data as well as the control information
which is passed between the entities laying off from a
zone of one entity and moving into the zone of other
entity [129], [269], [270].
• Uniform: Such types of handovers authentication are more
prominent in LTE and LTE-A networks as these can
be used for all types of networks [271], [272]. This is
one of the most suitable handovers procedures for smart
M-IoT networks. Such mechanisms are low-complex,
computationally-inexpensive and highly secure solutions
for mobile security.
• Media-Independent: Such types of handovers rely on the
security governed by IEEE 802.21a-2012 for supporting
security along with media independence while shifting
services from one entity to another in an inter-handover
mode [273], [274], [299], [300]. Amalgamation of MIH
solutions with F-PMIPv6 techniques is gaining popularity
because of their low complexity and high security [142].
D. Summary and Insights
In this section, we surveyed solutions for secure handover of
smart M-IoT devices. The devices can perform intra- or inter-
handover depending on the layout of the network. Proactive
authentication plays a key role in securing service layoffs
between the devices and can ensure long-sessions without
disrupting the services of a user under movement. Distributed
security protocols play a considerable role in managing nodes
under high mobility scenarios by preventing unnecessary passes
to the core for re-authentication of devices.
Handoff latency, discovery time, bandwidth support, mutual
authentication, and overheads are some of the key metrics to
be considered for selecting an efficient handover scheme for
M-IoT, as shown in Appendix.Tables XI and XII. There are
plenty of solutions which have diversified the security aspects
of handovers and provide a wide range of services for handling
billions of IoT devices. Despite this, the majority of them fails
on the aspect of performance and does not account for the
tradeoff between the security and Quality of Experience (QoE).
Thus, new approaches are required that can take into account
these requirements of security as well as the performance before
their final deployment and testing while causing minimum
overheads during handoffs.
X. RESEARCH CHALLENGES, OPEN ISSUES AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
Security, privacy, and trust are supported through specific
requirements of a system, which are the open challenges to be
resolved in M-IoT. Most of the challenges and issues can be
acquired from the studies presented in [24]–[40], [301]–[306].
From these studies, it is noticeable that the major open issues
to be resolved for M-IoT are:
• Satisfaction of the security requirements: It is of utmost
importance that any approach which aims to facilitate
security, privacy and trust in M-IoT must satisfy certain
security requirements that are listed below:
– Mutual Authentication: Security agreement between
each entity in M-IoT is of utmost importance. Each
device must be able to identify the correctness of
every other device involved in transmission. The trust
relationship between the devices can help to attain
the requirements of mutual authentication.
– Secure Key Exchange: Security keys are the pillar
for preventing attacks in a network. It is a must that
keys are exchanged secretly over a secure channel
and must not reveal at any instance of operations.
– Session Key Management: This is a requirement
which helps to secure the communication between
the M-IoT devices. It is necessary for an approach to
use a secure key which is different from other keys
while communicating with a particular device in a
network. Session keys must be renewed consistently
for preventing any attacks because of lack of key
freshness.
– Perfect Forward Secrecy: In a communication setup,
capturing of long-term keys should not be able to
generate past session keys. This helps to secure
previous contents and also protect future compromises
and password sharing.
– Defense against a Replay Attack: Repetition of valid
data can reveal the security policies as well as lead
to overconsumption of resources in the protection
of the system. Such kinds of attacks are caused by
interceptions and must be avoided as the traffic in
M-IoT is very sensitive and crucial.
– Access Control and Authorization: It is required that
the new solutions are able to provide control on the
accessibility limits of each device and also provide
policies for authorization and management of content
along with session formations.
– Defense against a Resource Exhaustion Attack: This
type of attack should be prevented as resource
exhaustion attacks can exploit the network and the M-
IoT devices through excessive key operations. Such
an attack may lead to the shutdown of the entire
network.
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• Performance tradeoff: Apart from the security requirement,
it is required that a solution should not compromise
the performance of the system and must be capable of
handling the performance tradeoffs due to computational
burden of security mechanisms. The approaches must
be able to handle the implementation overheads during
continuous operations.
• Platform compatibility: Due to a difference in the types of
devices and their configurations, it is difficult to support
platform compatibility in M-IoT. However, there is still
a strong requirement of such solutions which can be
operated irrespective of the types of technologies being
operated over M-IoT devices. Platform compatibility can
be obtained by defining security mechanisms which rely
on operations that have lesser variations when shifted
across devices.
• Resource utilization: Efficient utilization of resources
like memory and power and prevention of their over-
consumption can save the operations up to a longer
duration. Resource utilization can be attained by using
novel network architectures as well as independent layers
for each operation in M-IoT. Such a facility can be
obtained through SDN-NFV technologies. As discussed
earlier, facilities like osmotic computing, fog computing,
catalytic computing and edge-crowd modeling can be used
for handling resource utilization while providing security
and privacy solutions for M-IoT.
• Insider threat management: Prevention of theft, fraud,
and damage through non-compromising models is re-
quired as this can help to manage the false-occurrences
caused by the criminal aspects of M-IoT users. Models
like blockchain, distributed mobility management, and
crowdsourcing can be used for management of insider
threats in a system.
Future aspects of M-IoT are quite vast as it has to deal with
a lot of dependencies of the underlaid architecture. Network
designing and placement of components play a key role in
providing security in M-IoT; whereas privacy has a lot to do
with an individual as well as the service providers. Trust is built
on the backbone of security and privacy and its management is
as crucial as other services. Till date, two of the major aspects
to achieve in trust management is its visualization and formal
way of expressing for a large set of users. Even in the lights
of different solutions, there are no standard mechanisms which
can help to visualize trust as a property of a device. Thus,
future approaches must consider formally defining trust and
building some standard rules which should operate together
with the security and privacy considerations for enhancing
the practicality of M-IoT services to users. In lieu of various
properties of existing solutions as discussed throughout this
article, following key points can be used for directing further
research on different aspects of smart M-IoT.
A. Security related future research directions
• Network Monitoring in M-IoT: M-IoT security relies on
the true operations of the entities involved in providing
services to the users. Any faulty equipment can result in
sets of failures which may compromise the operations
in M-IoT leading to the devastation of infrastructure as
well as data. Futuristic approaches must ensure efficient
deployment of solutions like IDS, network monitors,
and ethical packet sniffers for enhancing the security
requirements. Network monitoring should emphasize the
resource-based evaluation of the involved devices so as
to prevent service halts and offer ultra-reliable QoE to its
users. New tools can be developed which can analyze the
traffic passes between the devices. In addition, security of
network monitors is to be considered for preventing any
eavesdropping on the ethically gathered data. Monitoring
tools and procedures should possess encapsulation as a
key property and prevent and disclosure of type and make
of equipment even if the attacker possesses maximum
data [307] [308].
• Vulnerability Assessment: For secure operations, it is of
utmost importance that the entire network is consistently
monitored for potential vulnerabilities that may lead to
different types of threats. Such a task can be attained by
defining security policies for each entity in the network
and building profilers which can help to assess devices in
case of weird behavior or functioning [309]. Vulnerability
assessment can help to determine the influence of attack
on a particular set of entities [69]. The vulnerability
assessments should be conducted at both the user-side and
network-side. User-side evaluations should be abstracted
and must not consume excessive operations and must be
low on overheads; network-side evaluations should be
conducted with zero-maintenance time and any service
halts. Anomaly detection, community classification and
attacker marking are the main targets of vulnerability
assessment [99]. All of these are open issues and their
applicability are subject to application and operational
scenarios.
• Policies for Zero-day Attack: Zero-day attacks in software
modules of M-IoT are the key threats to its security. It is
difficult to identify such possibilities unless made public
by the attacker. Most of these are identified during the
development stage, but some of these are marked during
the regular testing operations. It becomes the liability
of service providers and software-distributors to provide
security patches as soon as vulnerabilities are identi-
fied. Further, providing customer knowledge and making
mandatory to download and install security updates should
be considered for effective countermeasures against such
attacks [310]–[312].
• Hacking and Accessibility: Despite always being a hot
topic, hacking and accessibility are yet open future chal-
lenges in smart M-IoT. It is required that new solutions are
developed for code obfuscation and new policies are made
for controlling the accessibility to M-IoT components and
its services [313] [314]. Pre-authentication mechanisms
and multi-registration phases can help to attain these
requirements. However, performance and overheads are
the major issues attached to such provisioning, and any
approach controlling the accessibility must not cause
performance overheads and should not disturb the regular
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operations of the network.
B. Privacy related future research directions
• Prevention of Device Profiling: Data gathering is one
of the key requirements of modern day organizations to
provide a personalized experience to its users. However,
the process of data gathering and information analysis may
cause different types of threats by deliberately breaching
the privacy of users. Collection of data and using it for
evaluating user behavior and controlling the preferences
may allow a threat to confidentiality and integrity of an
individual; further, hold on information by an eavesdropper
leads to vulnerable conditions, which violates the network
policies [315] [316]. Thus, to overcome such issues,
it is required that futuristic solutions should not allow
unauthorized device profiling and information gathering
procedures must be controlled by the service providers. In
addition, no selling of data should be done as this violates
the personal space of an individual. Use of device profiling
for advertisements for generating revenues is fine, but it
should not affect the preferences of an individual.
• Control over Data Gathering: M-IoT devices are sensitive
to information and data across their network is delicate to
threats. Classification of data and generating knowledge
by data-processing disclose different types of vulnera-
bilities, which are the tools of hackers for exploiting
the network and its users. Approaches are required that
prohibits uncontrolled data gathering and limits the service
providing apps from collecting excessive information
other than the required ones. Data gathering procedures
should be controlled by app hosting platforms and as per
the individual is concerned, they must be provided with
knowledge of using authenticated sources to prevent any
enforced data gatherings [170] [174].
• Personalized Settings: Every application, be it open source
or proprietary, must provide preferential settings to its
users, where they can manage and control the amount of
information to be shared across the M-IoT platforms. It
is necessary that every user should be able to monitor the
amount of information and extend up to which his/her
information is used and for what purposes. Personalized
settings should be supported by access management,
accountability and authorization controls.
• Managing Information Flow: For sufficiently high pri-
vacy settings, every entity in M-IoT must be provided
with facilities for managing information flow. These
information flows should be manageable remotely, thus,
different techniques and solutions can be developed for
such requirements which pave a way for controlling the
information flow even being present on-site. Development
of toolkits and apps for information flow are other future
research challenges in smart M-IoT. Further, these can be
used with AI techniques to perform a priori probabilistic
checks on the occurrence of attacks for a particular set
of settings.
C. Trust related future research directions
• Dedicated Node Management: Trust is a compliance
degree between the entities to ensure accurate operational
behavior in the network. M-IoT is dedicated to operating
networks which will heavily depend on the crowd sources
for the majority of their operations. Such a dependency
raises a crucial requirement of node management and
control over the service-relationships between the devices.
Research must be conducted in this direction while
ensuring how the devices will interact on basis of what
policies they can accurately judge each others’ correct-
ness [317] [318]. It is required that certain solutions must
be developed that can provide dedicated node management
at a fine granular level while leveraging the properties of
existing solutions for trust management. Different type of
protocols can be designed that takes situational awareness
as one of the key properties for ensuring trust-aware
communications in M-IoT. In addition, contextual behavior
monitoring and aspect-based classification can help to
ensure trust-compliance between the entities of M-IoT.
• Trust Visualization and Markings: There are a huge
set of applications and approaches which emphasize on
computing trust in different types of network as per
the requirements of the applications. But the majority
of these fail to provide any conceptualization on the
visualization process which helps to easy identification
of service-law violators. It is required that research must
be conducted in this direction while finding a benchmark
which can be used as a backbone for trust-visualization and
markings [217]. In addition, facilities must be provided
to check trust roles and authorization activities across the
network.
• Anomaly Detection and Recovery: Anomaly detection
is the other key aspect of trust maintenance solutions.
Futuristic research must focus on providing enhanced, on-
demand and real-time facilities for detecting anomalies.
This must accompany the solutions which can help to
recover the users which are marked as anomalies by
allowing them to re-justify their associations with the
networks’ terms and conditions and their flow control [99].
It is required that trust evaluations must lift themselves
from the traditional reputation-based systems as such
facilities can easily fall prey to Sybil attacks and may
mislead the trust-maintenance process.
• Distributed Evaluations and Trust offloading: Apart from
trust-management, the approaches are required which
can operate in a distributed manner and yet provide
competitive results as that of centralized solutions. This
will help to prevent any single point of failure [126], [217],
[219], [319]. Such solutions can be fixated on different
offloading techniques which can be operated in parallel
to data evaluations and does not interfere with the regular
network operations. Development of distributed IDS and
crowd-sourced IDS can be crucial solutions for attaining
distributed evaluations as well as trust offloading.
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D. Necessity of Amalgamation
Security, privacy, and trust in M-IoT go hand in hand.
A breach of policies of one may lead to attack through
other. Security policies must be strong enough to prevent any
unauthorized access to the personal information of an individual
in M-IoT and privacy policies must ensure that the data is
always shared with the trusted party. Such an activity is also
operational in reverse and holds true for any sort of network
formations in smart M-IoT. The necessities for amalgamating
these solutions can be accounted for following points:
• Prevention against Cyber Spies: Combining all the aspects
of security, privacy and trust for smart M-IoT ensure
protection against cyber bullies, spies, and service breach-
ers [73], [320], [321]. These three requirements ensure
that the network is operating in closed perimeter even its
operations are distributed across the huge cyber network.
Here, close perimeter refers to the path lengths and routes
which can be tracked down easily and conterminously
without many overheads.
• Risk Assessment and Mitigation: A network should
be assessed for potential risks in its operations. It is
necessary that the risk evaluations are conducted on the
basis of combined rules for security, privacy, and trust.
Risk evaluations are usually probabilistic, however, with
complete details of all possible rules, these can be used
for generating a particular output that yields visible results
for risk assessments [322]–[324].
• Reliable Communications: Modern network services,
especially the ones operating for smart M-IoT, require
reliable connections for their continuous operations. Such
a requirement can be ensured only if the network compo-
nents and their services satisfy the requirements associated
with security, privacy, and trust. In fact, the upcoming
applications in smart M-IoT not only demand reliable
communications, instead their focus is on ultra-reliable
communications [325] [326] with lower dependencies and
controlled cohesion and coupling amongst their software
solutions.
Thus, it becomes inevitably important to develop solutions,
which hold true justifications for security, privacy, and trust at
the same instance and at the same level.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
Security solutions must be able to fortify authentication,
confidentiality, integrity, freshness, access control and autho-
rizations for M-IoT devices and its platforms, whereas privacy
must support information protection for every device and its
users. Both of these requisites can be obtained by building
trust relationships across the networks. However, there exists a
mixture of approaches that consider one of these requisites but
ignore the other requirements. Previous studies have lighted
such issues and withal compared the majority of them on the
substructure of different parameters. However, prior studies
have shown a constrained role in evaluating security, privacy
and trust especially for keenly intellective and connected M-IoT
networks. This paper considered the shortcomings of existing
literature and provided an in-depth evaluation of different
approaches which fixates on the crucial aspects of security,
privacy, and trust.
This article covered the concept and ideology of smart M-IoT
networks and its devices followed by their applications, ad-
vances, challenges, characteristics, technologies, and standards.
Then the literature evaluations were presented for approaches
which emphasized secure frameworks, data-privacy, secure
protocols, physical layer security, and handover protections for
smart M-IoT. Next, different ways for analyzing the security,
privacy, and trust in M-IoT were discussed followed by roadmap
and open issues along with highlights of some pertinent
materials which can be followed for improving understandings
in this direction of research. This study has highlighted the
requirements of new solutions, which can collectively resolve
the issues related to security, privacy, and trust in smart M-
IoT without compromising the performance and complexity of
operations.
REFERENCES
[1] I. Farris, A. Orsino, L. Militano, A. Iera, and G. Araniti, “Federated
iot services leveraging 5g technologies at the edge,” Ad Hoc Networks,
vol. 68, pp. 58–69, 2018.
[2] W. Liu, K. Nakauchi, and Y. Shoji, “A neighbor-based probabilistic
broadcast protocol for data dissemination in mobile iot networks,” IEEE
Access, 2018.
[3] A. Ghasempour and T. K. Moon, “Optimizing the number of collectors
in machine-to-machine advanced metering infrastructure architecture for
internet of things-based smart grid,” in Green Technologies Conference
(GreenTech), pp. 51–55, IEEE, 2016.
[4] S.-M. Cheng, P.-Y. Chen, C.-C. Lin, and H.-C. Hsiao, “Traffic-aware
patching for cyber security in mobile iot,” IEEE Communications
Magazine, vol. 55, no. 7, pp. 29–35, 2017.
[5] S. K. Goudos, P. I. Dallas, S. Chatziefthymiou, and S. Kyriazakos,
“A survey of iot key enabling and future technologies: 5g, mobile iot,
sematic web and applications,” Wireless Personal Communications,
vol. 97, no. 2, pp. 1645–1675, 2017.
[6] A. Ghasempour, “Optimum number of aggregators based on power
consumption, cost, and network lifetime in advanced metering infras-
tructure architecture for smart grid internet of things,” in 13th IEEE
Annual Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC),
pp. 295–296, IEEE, 2016.
[7] “Low power, wide area networks (lpwan).” https://www.link-
labs.com/blog/past-present-future-lpwan [Last Accessed - September
2018].
[8] V. Sharma, I. You, G. Pau, M. Collotta, J. D. Lim, and J. N. Kim,
“Lorawan-based energy-efficient surveillance by drones for intelligent
transportation systems,” Energies, vol. 11, no. 3, p. 573, 2018.
[9] F. Adelantado, X. Vilajosana, P. Tuset-Peiro, B. Martinez, J. Melia-
Segui, and T. Watteyne, “Understanding the limits of lorawan,” IEEE
Communications Magazine, vol. 55, no. 9, pp. 34–40, 2017.
[10] P. Neumann, J. Montavont, and T. Noe¨l, “Indoor deployment of
low-power wide area networks (lpwan): A lorawan case study,” in
12th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing,
Networking and Communications (WiMob), pp. 1–8, IEEE, 2016.
[11] J. Jermyn, R. P. Jover, I. Murynets, M. Istomin, and S. Stolfo,
“Scalability of machine to machine systems and the internet of things
on lte mobile networks,” in 16th International Symposium on a World
of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM), pp. 1–9,
IEEE, 2015.
[12] R. P. Jover and I. Murynets, “Connection-less communication of
iot devices over lte mobile networks,” in 12th Annual International
Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking (SECON),
pp. 247–255, IEEE, 2015.
[13] S. Chakrabarty, D. W. Engels, and S. Thathapudi, “Black sdn for the
internet of things,” in 12th International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc
and Sensor Systems (MASS), pp. 190–198, IEEE, 2015.
[14] M. Ojo, D. Adami, and S. Giordano, “A sdn-iot architecture with nfv
implementation,” in Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps), pp. 1–6, IEEE,
2016.
24
[15] V. Sharma, F. Song, I. You, and H.-C. Chao, “Efficient management
and fast handovers in software defined wireless networks using uavs,”
IEEE Network, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 78–85, 2017.
[16] H. Aksu, L. Babun, M. Conti, G. Tolomei, and A. S. Uluagac,
“Advertising in the iot era: Vision and challenges,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.04102, 2018.
[17] M. Ammar, G. Russello, and B. Crispo, “Internet of things: A survey
on the security of iot frameworks,” Journal of Information Security and
Applications, vol. 38, pp. 8–27, 2018.
[18] Y.-W. Sawng, H.-W. Kim, S.-J. Lee, and J.-W. Choi, “Technology
forecasting of iot healthcare with big data analysis,” ICCC Society of
Korea, pp. 89–90, 2017.
[19] A. Ghasempour, “Optimized scalable decentralized hybrid advanced
metering infrastructure for smart grid,” in International Conference on
Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), pp. 223–228, IEEE,
2015.
[20] A. Ghasempour, “Optimum packet service and arrival rates in advanced
metering infrastructure architecture of smart grid,” in Green Technologies
Conference (GreenTech), pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2016.
[21] A. Ghasempour, “Optimized advanced metering infrastructure architec-
ture of smart grid based on total cost, energy, and delay,” in Power &
Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT),
pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2016.
[22] A. Chasempour, “Optimizing the advanced metering infrastructure
architecture in smart grid,” All Graduate Theses and Dissertations,
5023, 2016.
[23] V. Sharma, F. Song, I. You, and M. Atiquzzaman, “Energy efficient
device discovery for reliable communication in 5g-based iot and bsns
using unmanned aerial vehicles,” Journal of Network and Computer
Applications, vol. 97, pp. 79–95, 2017.
[24] W. Feng, Z. Yan, H. Zhang, K. Zeng, Y. Xiao, and Y. T. Hou, “A survey
on security, privacy and trust in mobile crowdsourcing,” IEEE Internet
of Things Journal, 2017.
[25] C. M. Medaglia and A. Serbanati, “An overview of privacy and security
issues in the internet of things,” in The Internet of Things, pp. 389–395,
Springer, 2010.
[26] G. M. Køien, “Reflections on trust in devices: an informal survey
of human trust in an internet-of-things context,” Wireless Personal
Communications, vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 495–510, 2011.
[27] R. Bonetto, N. Bui, V. Lakkundi, A. Olivereau, A. Serbanati, and
M. Rossi, “Secure communication for smart iot objects: Protocol stacks,
use cases and practical examples,” in International Symposium on
a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM),
pp. 1–7, IEEE, 2012.
[28] K.-D. Chang and J.-L. Chen, “A survey of trust management in wsns,
internet of things and future internet,” KSII Transactions on Internet &
Information Systems, vol. 6, no. 1, 2012.
[29] T. Bhattasali, R. Chaki, and N. Chaki, “Study of security issues
in pervasive environment of next generation internet of things,” in
Computer Information Systems and Industrial Management, pp. 206–
217, Springer, 2013.
[30] R. Roman, J. Zhou, and J. Lopez, “On the features and challenges
of security and privacy in distributed internet of things,” Computer
Networks, vol. 57, no. 10, pp. 2266–2279, 2013.
[31] Z. Yan, P. Zhang, and A. V. Vasilakos, “A survey on trust management
for internet of things,” Journal of network and computer applications,
vol. 42, pp. 120–134, 2014.
[32] Q. Jing, A. V. Vasilakos, J. Wan, J. Lu, and D. Qiu, “Security of the
internet of things: perspectives and challenges,” Wireless Networks,
vol. 20, no. 8, pp. 2481–2501, 2014.
[33] L. Malina, J. Hajny, R. Fujdiak, and J. Hosek, “On perspective of
security and privacy-preserving solutions in the internet of things,”
Computer Networks, vol. 102, pp. 83–95, 2016.
[34] S. Li, T. Tryfonas, and H. Li, “The internet of things: a security point
of view,” Internet Research, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 337–359, 2016.
[35] J. Zhou, Z. Cao, X. Dong, and A. V. Vasilakos, “Security and privacy for
cloud-based iot: Challenges,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 55,
no. 1, pp. 26–33, 2017.
[36] Y. Yang, L. Wu, G. Yin, L. Li, and H. Zhao, “A survey on security and
privacy issues in internet-of-things,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal,
vol. 4, pp. 1250–1258, Oct 2017.
[37] L. Chen, S. Thombre, K. Jrvinen, E. S. Lohan, A. Aln-Savikko,
H. Leppkoski, M. Z. H. Bhuiyan, S. Bu-Pasha, G. N. Ferrara, S. Honkala,
J. Lindqvist, L. Ruotsalainen, P. Korpisaari, and H. Kuusniemi, “Ro-
bustness, security and privacy in location-based services for future iot:
A survey,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 8956–8977, 2017.
[38] S. Sicari, A. Rizzardi, L. A. Grieco, and A. Coen-Porisini, “Security,
privacy and trust in internet of things: The road ahead,” Computer
networks, vol. 76, pp. 146–164, 2015.
[39] O. Arias, J. Wurm, K. Hoang, and Y. Jin, “Privacy and security in
internet of things and wearable devices,” IEEE Transactions on Multi-
Scale Computing Systems, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 99–109, 2015.
[40] K. Yang, D. Blaauw, and D. Sylvester, “Hardware designs for security
in ultra-low-power iot systems: An overview and survey,” IEEE Micro,
vol. 37, pp. 72–89, November 2017.
[41] A. Ghasempour and J. H. Gunther, “Finding the optimal number of
aggregators in machine-to-machine advanced metering infrastructure
architecture of smart grid based on cost, delay, and energy consumption,”
in 13th Annual Consumer Communications & Networking Conference
(CCNC), pp. 960–963, IEEE, 2016.
[42] V. Sharma, K. Lee, S. Kwon, J. Kim, H. Park, K. Yim, and S.-Y. Lee, “A
consensus framework for reliability and mitigation of zero-day attacks
in iot,” Security and Communication Networks, vol. 2017, 2017.
[43] F. Kammu¨ller, M. Kerber, and C. W. Probst, “Insider threats and auctions:
Formalization, mechanized proof, and code generation,” Journal of
Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable
Applications, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 44–78, 2017.
[44] V. Sharma, I. You, and G. Kul, “Socializing drones for inter-service
operability in ultra-dense wireless networks using blockchain,” in
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Managing Insider Security
Threats, pp. 81–84, ACM, 2017.
[45] G. Li, H. Zhou, G. Li, and B. Feng, “Application-aware and dynamic
security function chaining for mobile networks,” Journal of Internet
Services and Information Security (JISIS), vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 21–34,
2017.
[46] V. Sharma, I. You, and R. Kumar, “Isma: Intelligent sensing model for
anomalies detection in cross platform osns with a case study on iot,”
IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 3284–3301, 2017.
[47] “Iot standards and protocols.” https://www.postscapes.com/internet-of-
things-protocols/ [Last Accessed - September 2018].
[48] “Gsma iot security guidelines.” https://www.gsma.com/iot/iot-
security/iot-security-guidelines/ [Last Accessed - September 2018].
[49] K. Mekki, E. Bajic, F. Chaxel, and F. Meyer, “A comparative study of
lpwan technologies for large-scale iot deployment,” ICT Express, 2018.
[50] J. Peta¨ja¨ja¨rvi, K. Mikhaylov, M. Ha¨ma¨la¨inen, and J. Iinatti, “Evaluation
of lora lpwan technology for remote health and wellbeing monitor-
ing,” in 10th International Symposium on Medical Information and
Communication Technology (ISMICT), pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2016.
[51] Z. Shelby and C. Bormann, 6LoWPAN: The wireless embedded Internet,
vol. 43. John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
[52] C. A. Trasvin˜a-Moreno, R. Blasco, R. Casas, and A´. Asensio, “A network
performance analysis of lora modulation for lpwan sensor devices,” in
Ubiquitous Computing and Ambient Intelligence, pp. 174–181, Springer,
2016.
[53] R. Ratasuk, B. Vejlgaard, N. Mangalvedhe, and A. Ghosh, “Nb-iot
system for m2m communication,” in Wireless Communications and
Networking Conference (WCNC), pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2016.
[54] Standards, “http://standards.ieee.org/innovate/iot/stds.html,” [last ac-
cessed March 10, 2018].
[55] IoT, “https://www.postscapes.com/internet-of-things-protocols/,” [last
accessed March 10, 2018].
[56] M. R. Palattella, N. Accettura, X. Vilajosana, T. Watteyne, L. A.
Grieco, G. Boggia, and M. Dohler, “Standardized protocol stack for
the internet of (important) things,” IEEE communications surveys &
tutorials, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 1389–1406, 2013.
[57] “Ibm-watson iot.” https://developer.ibm.com/iotplatform/ [Last Accessed
- September 2018].
[58] “Microsoft azure iot suite.” https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/internet-
of-things [Last Accessed - September 2018].
[59] “Openiot.” http://www.openiot.eu/ [Last Accessed - September 2018].
[60] “Ocf.” https://openconnectivity.org/ [Last Accessed - September 2018].
[61] Y. Amit, R. Hay, R. Saltzman, and A. Sharabani, “Pinpointing security
vulnerabilities in computer software applications,” Aug. 13 2013. US
Patent 8,510,842.
[62] O. H. Alhazmi, Y. K. Malaiya, and I. Ray, “Measuring, analyzing and
predicting security vulnerabilities in software systems,” Computers &
Security, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 219–228, 2007.
[63] K. Benton, L. J. Camp, and C. Small, “Openflow vulnerability
assessment,” in Proceedings of the second ACM SIGCOMM workshop
on Hot topics in software defined networking, pp. 151–152, ACM, 2013.
[64] “Open web application security project (owasp).”
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Main Page [Last Accessed -
October 2018].
25
[65] K. Peguero, N. Zhang, and X. Cheng, “An empirical study of the
framework impact on the security of javascript web applications,” in
Companion of the The Web Conference 2018 on The Web Conference
2018, pp. 753–758, International World Wide Web Conferences Steering
Committee, 2018.
[66] Y. Fang, Y. Li, L. Liu, and C. Huang, “Deepxss: Cross site scripting
detection based on deep learning,” in Proceedings of the 2018 Interna-
tional Conference on Computing and Artificial Intelligence, pp. 47–51,
ACM, 2018.
[67] D. Sagar, S. Kukreja, J. Brahma, S. Tyagi, and P. Jain, “Studying open
source vulnerability scanners for vulnerabilities in web applications,”
IIOAB JOURNAL, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 43–49, 2018.
[68] G. Lancioni, S. Hunt, and M. D. Wood, “Method and system to
accelerate iot patch propagation and reduce security vulnerabilities
exposure time,” Oct. 4 2018. US Patent App. 15/476,219.
[69] S. Samtani, S. Yu, H. Zhu, M. Patton, J. Matherly, and H. Chen,
“Identifying supervisory control and data acquisition (scada) devices
and their vulnerabilities on the internet of things (iot): A text mining
approach,” IEEE Intelligent Systems, 2018.
[70] V. Sharma, G. Choudhary, Y. Ko, and I. You, “Behavior and vulnerability
assessment of drones-enabled industrial internet of things (iiot),” IEEE
Access, vol. 6, pp. 43368–43383, 2018.
[71] K. Kim, J. Lee, and W. Jung, “Method of building a security vulnerability
information collection and management system for analyzing the security
vulnerabilities of iot devices,” in Advanced Multimedia and Ubiquitous
Engineering, pp. 205–210, Springer, 2017.
[72] M. Frustaci, P. Pace, G. Aloi, and G. Fortino, “Evaluating critical
security issues of the iot world: present and future challenges,” IEEE
Internet of Things Journal, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 2483–2495, 2018.
[73] K. Kim, I. Kim, and J. Lim, “National cyber security enhancement
scheme for intelligent surveillance capacity with public iot environment,”
The Journal of Supercomputing, vol. 73, no. 3, pp. 1140–1151, 2017.
[74] I. Stellios, P. Kotzanikolaou, M. Psarakis, C. Alcaraz, and J. Lopez, “A
survey of iot-enabled cyberattacks: Assessing attack paths to critical
infrastructures and services,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
2018.
[75] W. Xie, Y. Jiang, Y. Tang, N. Ding, and Y. Gao, “Vulnerability detection
in iot firmware: A survey,” in Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS),
2017 IEEE 23rd International Conference on, pp. 769–772, IEEE, 2017.
[76] Z. Huang, S. Liu, X. Mao, K. Chen, and J. Li, “Insight of the protection
for data security under selective opening attacks,” Information Sciences,
vol. 412, pp. 223–241, 2017.
[77] J. Li, J. Li, D. Xie, and Z. Cai, “Secure auditing and deduplicating data
in cloud,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 2386–
2396, 2016.
[78] P. Li, J. Li, Z. Huang, C.-Z. Gao, W.-B. Chen, and K. Chen, “Privacy-
preserving outsourced classification in cloud computing,” Cluster
Computing, pp. 1–10, 2017.
[79] C. Dsouza, G.-J. Ahn, and M. Taguinod, “Policy-driven security
management for fog computing: Preliminary framework and a case
study,” in 15th International Conference on Information Reuse and
Integration (IRI), pp. 16–23, IEEE, 2014.
[80] S. Cirani, M. Picone, P. Gonizzi, L. Veltri, and G. Ferrari, “Iot-oas: An
oauth-based authorization service architecture for secure services in iot
scenarios,” IEEE sensors journal, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 1224–1234, 2015.
[81] K. S. Sahoo, B. Sahoo, and A. Panda, “A secured sdn framework for iot,”
in International Conference on Man and Machine Interfacing (MAMI),
pp. 1–4, IEEE, 2015.
[82] J. Pacheco, S. Satam, S. Hariri, C. Grijalva, and H. Berkenbrock, “Iot
security development framework for building trustworthy smart car
services,” in IEEE Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics
(ISI), pp. 237–242, IEEE, 2016.
[83] P. P. Pereira, J. Eliasson, and J. Delsing, “An authentication and access
control framework for coap-based internet of things,” in 40th Annual
Conference of the Industrial Electronics Society, pp. 5293–5299, IEEE,
2014.
[84] C. Gonzalez, S. M. Charfadine, O. Flauzac, and F. Nolot, “Sdn-based
security framework for the iot in distributed grid,” in International Mul-
tidisciplinary Conference on Computer and Energy Science (SpliTech),
pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2016.
[85] L. Seitz, G. Selander, and C. Gehrmann, “Authorization framework for
the internet-of-things,” in 14th International Symposium and Workshops
on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM),
pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2013.
[86] J. L. Herna´ndez-Ramos, M. V. Moreno, J. B. Bernabe´, D. G. Carrillo,
and A. F. Skarmeta, “Safir: Secure access framework for iot-enabled
services on smart buildings,” Journal of Computer and System Sciences,
vol. 81, no. 8, pp. 1452–1463, 2015.
[87] A. Guchhait, “A hybrid v2v system for collision-free high-speed internet
access in intelligent transportation system,” Transactions on Emerging
Telecommunications Technologies, vol. 29, no. 3, p. e3282, 2018.
[88] N. Dagdee and R. Vijaywargiya, “Credential based hybrid access control
methodology for shared electronic health records,” in International
Conference on Information Management and Engineering, pp. 624–628,
IEEE, 2009.
[89] H. Abie and I. Balasingham, “Risk-based adaptive security for smart iot
in ehealth,” in Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Body
Area Networks, pp. 269–275, ICST (Institute for Computer Sciences,
Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering), 2012.
[90] M. Ge and D. S. Kim, “A framework for modeling and assessing
security of the internet of things,” in 21st International Conference on
Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS), pp. 776–781, IEEE, 2015.
[91] B. R. Ray, J. Abawajy, and M. Chowdhury, “Scalable rfid security
framework and protocol supporting internet of things,” Computer
Networks, vol. 67, pp. 89–103, 2014.
[92] V. R. Kebande and I. Ray, “A generic digital forensic investigation
framework for internet of things (iot),” in 4th International Conference
on Future Internet of Things and Cloud (FiCloud), pp. 356–362, IEEE,
2016.
[93] Q. Wang and S. Sawhney, “Vecure: A practical security framework to
protect the can bus of vehicles,” in International Conference on the
Internet of Things (IOT), pp. 13–18, IEEE, 2014.
[94] X. Huang, P. Craig, H. Lin, and Z. Yan, “Seciot: a security framework
for the internet of things,” Security and communication networks, vol. 9,
no. 16, pp. 3083–3094, 2016.
[95] J. G. Mclachlan, A. J. Farrugia, and N. T. Sullivan, “Adaptive secondary
authentication criteria based on account data,” May 26 2015. US Patent
9,043,887.
[96] M. Tao, J. Zuo, Z. Liu, A. Castiglione, and F. Palmieri, “Multi-
layer cloud architectural model and ontology-based security service
framework for iot-based smart homes,” Future Generation Computer
Systems, vol. 78, pp. 1040–1051, 2018.
[97] A. F. A. Rahman, M. Daud, and M. Z. Mohamad, “Securing sensor to
cloud ecosystem using internet of things (iot) security framework,” in
Proceedings of the International Conference on Internet of things and
Cloud Computing, p. 79, ACM, 2016.
[98] S. Ahmad, A. Lavin, S. Purdy, and Z. Agha, “Unsupervised real-
time anomaly detection for streaming data,” Neurocomputing, vol. 262,
pp. 134–147, 2017.
[99] v. sharma, R. KUMAR, W. H. Cheng, M. Atiquzzaman, K. Srinivasan,
and A. Zomaya, “Nhad: Neuro-fuzzy based horizontal anomaly detection
in online social networks,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering, pp. 1–1, 2018.
[100] M. Toledano, I. Cohen, Y. Ben-Simhon, and I. Tadeski, “Real-time
anomaly detection system for time series at scale,” in KDD-Workshop
on Anomaly Detection in Finance, pp. 56–65, 2018.
[101] M. Ahmed and A. N. Mahmood, “Network traffic pattern analysis using
improved information theoretic co-clustering based collective anomaly
detection,” in International Conference on Security and Privacy in
Communication Systems, pp. 204–219, Springer, 2014.
[102] D. Monniaux, “Decision procedures for the analysis of cryptographic
protocols by logics of belief,” in Proceedings of the 12th Computer
Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 44–54, IEEE, 1999.
[103] M. Cohen and M. Dam, “Logical omniscience in the semantics of
ban logic,” in Proceedings of the Foundations of Computer Security,
pp. 121–132, 2005.
[104] S. Matsuo, K. Miyazaki, A. Otsuka, and D. Basin, “How to evaluate
the security of real-life cryptographic protocols?,” in International
Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, pp. 182–194,
Springer, 2010.
[105] G. Bleumer, “Random oracle model,” in Encyclopedia of Cryptography
and Security, pp. 1027–1028, Springer, 2011.
[106] W. Mao, Modern cryptography: theory and practice. Prentice Hall
Professional Technical Reference, 2003.
[107] L. C. Paulson, “Inductive analysis of the internet protocol tls,” ACM
Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), vol. 2,
no. 3, pp. 332–351, 1999.
[108] A. Armando, D. Basin, Y. Boichut, Y. Chevalier, L. Compagna,
J. Cue´llar, P. H. Drielsma, P.-C. He´am, O. Kouchnarenko, J. Mantovani,
et al., “The avispa tool for the automated validation of internet security
protocols and applications,” in International conference on computer
aided verification, pp. 281–285, Springer, 2005.
26
[109] M. Kaufmann, P. Manolios, and J. S. Moore, Computer-aided reasoning:
ACL2 case studies, vol. 4. Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.
[110] R. Ku¨sters and T. Truderung, “Using proverif to analyze protocols with
diffie-hellman exponentiation,” in 22nd Computer Security Foundations
Symposium, CSF’09, pp. 157–171, IEEE, 2009.
[111] C. J. Cremers, “The scyther tool: Verification, falsification, and analysis
of security protocols,” in International Conference on Computer Aided
Verification, pp. 414–418, Springer, 2008.
[112] P. Urien, “Llcps: A new security framework based on tls for nfc p2p
applications in the internet of things,” in Consumer Communications
and Networking Conference (CCNC), pp. 845–846, IEEE, 2013.
[113] K. C. Park and D.-H. Shin, “Security assessment framework for iot
service,” Telecommunication Systems, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 193–209, 2017.
[114] C. Ma, S. Kulshrestha, W. Shi, Y. Okada, and R. Bose, “E-learning
material development framework supporting vr/ar based on linked data
for iot security education,” in International Conference on Emerging
Internetworking, Data & Web Technologies, pp. 479–491, Springer,
2018.
[115] S. Siboni, A. Shabtai, N. O. Tippenhauer, J. Lee, and Y. Elovici,
“Advanced security testbed framework for wearable iot devices,” ACM
Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT), vol. 16, no. 4, p. 26, 2016.
[116] H. Ning and H. Liu, “Cyber-physical-social based security architecture
for future internet of things,” Advances in Internet of Things, vol. 2,
no. 01, p. 1, 2012.
[117] J. B. Bernabe, J. L. Herna´ndez, M. V. Moreno, and A. F. S. Gomez,
“Privacy-preserving security framework for a social-aware internet of
things,” in International conference on ubiquitous computing and
ambient intelligence, pp. 408–415, Springer, 2014.
[118] D. Lake, R. M. R. Milito, M. Morrow, and R. Vargheese, “Internet of
things: Architectural framework for ehealth security,” Journal of ICT
Standardization, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 301–328, 2014.
[119] F. Wang, B. Ge, L. Zhang, Y. Chen, Y. Xin, and X. Li, “A system
framework of security management in enterprise systems,” Systems
Research and Behavioral Science, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 287–299, 2013.
[120] F. Olivier, G. Carlos, and N. Florent, “New security architecture for iot
network,” Procedia Computer Science, vol. 52, pp. 1028–1033, 2015.
[121] H. Shafagh and A. Hithnawi, “Security comes first, a public-key cryp-
tography framework for the internet of things,” in IEEE International
Conference on Distributed Computing in Sensor Systems (DCOSS),
pp. 135–136, IEEE, 2014.
[122] P. Kasinathan, G. Costamagna, H. Khaleel, C. Pastrone, and M. A.
Spirito, “An ids framework for internet of things empowered by
6lowpan,” in Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer
& communications security, pp. 1337–1340, ACM, 2013.
[123] O. Flauzac, C. Gonzalez, A. Hachani, and F. Nolot, “Sdn based archi-
tecture for iot and improvement of the security,” in 29th International
Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications
Workshops (WAINA), pp. 688–693, IEEE, 2015.
[124] V. K. Sehgal, A. Patrick, A. Soni, and L. Rajput, “Smart human security
framework using internet of things, cloud and fog computing,” in
Intelligent distributed computing, pp. 251–263, Springer, 2015.
[125] M. Gharibi, R. Boutaba, and S. L. Waslander, “Internet of drones,”
IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 1148–1162, 2016.
[126] V. Sharma, K. Srinivasan, D. N. K. Jayakody, O. Rana, and R. Kumar,
“Managing service-heterogeneity using osmotic computing,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1704.04213, 2017.
[127] V. Sharma, I. You, and R. Kumar, “Resource-based mobility man-
agement for video users in 5g using catalytic computing,” Computer
Communications, 2017.
[128] J. Li, Y. Zhang, X. Chen, and Y. Xiang, “Secure attribute-based data
sharing for resource-limited users in cloud computing,” Computers &
Security, vol. 72, pp. 1–12, 2018.
[129] D. Shin, V. Sharma, J. Kim, S. Kwon, and I. You, “Secure and
efficient protocol for route optimization in pmipv6-based smart home
iot networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 11100–11117, 2017.
[130] V. Sharma, I. You, D. N. K. Jayakody, and M. Atiquzzaman, “Cooper-
ative trust relaying and privacy preservation via edge-crowdsourcing in
social internet of things,” Future Generation Computer Systems, 2017.
[131] C. Deepa and B. Latha, “Hhsrp: a cluster based hybrid hierarchical se-
cure routing protocol for wireless sensor networks,” Cluster Computing,
pp. 1–17, 2017.
[132] S. Ullah, M. Imran, and M. Alnuem, “A hybrid and secure priority-
guaranteed mac protocol for wireless body area network,” International
Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, vol. 10, no. 2, p. 481761, 2014.
[133] Y. Yang and S. Roy, “Secure mac protocol for periodic smart metering
data communication with compressive sensing,” in Globecom Workshops
(GC Wkshps), pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2016.
[134] N. Li, J.-F. Martinez-Ortega, and V. H. Diaz, “Intelligent cross-layer and
reliable opportunistic routing algorithm for internet of things,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1710.00105, 2017.
[135] J. K. Vinayagam, C. Balaswamy, and K. Soundararajan, “Adopting cross
layer approach for detecting and segregating malicious nodes in manet,”
in International Conference on Signal Processing and Communication
(ICSPC), pp. 457–461, IEEE, 2017.
[136] S. Adibi, “A novel energy-efficient cross-application-layer platform with
qos-security support,” International Journal of Communication Systems,
vol. 30, no. 2, 2017.
[137] P. L. R. Chze and K. S. Leong, “A secure multi-hop routing for iot
communication,” in World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT),
pp. 428–432, IEEE, 2014.
[138] S. Raza, T. Voigt, and V. Jutvik, “Lightweight ikev2: a key management
solution for both the compressed ipsec and the ieee 802.15. 4 security,”
in Proceedings of the IETF workshop on smart object security, vol. 23,
Citeseer, 2012.
[139] R. Hummen, H. Wirtz, J. H. Ziegeldorf, J. Hiller, and K. Wehrle,
“Tailoring end-to-end ip security protocols to the internet of things,”
in 21st IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP),
pp. 1–10, IEEE, 2013.
[140] I. You and J.-H. Lee, “Spfp: Ticket-based secure handover for fast
proxy mobile ipv6 in 5g networks,” Computer Networks, vol. 129,
pp. 363–372, 2017.
[141] V. Sharma, I. You, F.-Y. Leu, and M. Atiquzzaman, “Secure and efficient
protocol for fast handover in 5g mobile xhaul networks,” Journal of
Network and Computer Applications, vol. 102, pp. 38–57, 2018.
[142] J. Guan, V. Sharma, I. You, and M. Atiquzzaman, “Extension of mih to
support fpmipv6 for optimized heterogeneous handover,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1705.09835, 2017.
[143] L. Xu, Y. He, X. Chen, and X. Huang, “Ticket-based handoff
authentication for wireless mesh networks,” Computer Networks, vol. 73,
pp. 185–194, 2014.
[144] P. Yadav and M. Hussain, “A secure aodv routing protocol with node
authentication,” in International conference of Electronics, Communica-
tion and Aerospace Technology (ICECA), vol. 1, pp. 489–493, IEEE,
2017.
[145] K. D. Kang et al., A Practical and Lightweight Source Authentication
Protocol Using One-Way Hash Chain in CAN. PhD thesis, DGIST,
2017.
[146] T. Kothmayr, C. Schmitt, W. Hu, M. Bru¨nig, and G. Carle, “Dtls based
security and two-way authentication for the internet of things,” Ad Hoc
Networks, vol. 11, no. 8, pp. 2710–2723, 2013.
[147] P. Porambage, C. Schmitt, P. Kumar, A. Gurtov, and M. Ylianttila,
“Two-phase authentication protocol for wireless sensor networks in dis-
tributed iot applications,” in Wireless Communications and Networking
Conference (WCNC), pp. 2728–2733, IEEE, 2014.
[148] R. Amin, N. Kumar, G. Biswas, R. Iqbal, and V. Chang, “A light
weight authentication protocol for iot-enabled devices in distributed
cloud computing environment,” Future Generation Computer Systems,
vol. 78, pp. 1005–1019, 2018.
[149] P. Gope, R. Amin, S. H. Islam, N. Kumar, and V. K. Bhalla,
“Lightweight and privacy-preserving rfid authentication scheme for
distributed iot infrastructure with secure localization services for smart
city environment,” Future Generation Computer Systems, 2017.
[150] S. Kalra and S. K. Sood, “Secure authentication scheme for iot and
cloud servers,” Pervasive and Mobile Computing, vol. 24, pp. 210–223,
2015.
[151] D. Mishra, P. Vijayakumar, V. Sureshkumar, R. Amin, S. H. Islam,
and P. Gope, “Efficient authentication protocol for secure multimedia
communications in iot-enabled wireless sensor networks,” Multimedia
Tools and Applications, pp. 1–31, 2017.
[152] A. M. I. Alkuhlani and S. Thorat, “Lightweight anonymity-preserving
authentication and key agreement protocol for the internet of things
environment,” in International Conference on Intelligent Information
Technologies, pp. 108–125, Springer, 2017.
[153] G. Sharma and S. Kalra, “A secure remote user authentication scheme for
smart cities e-governance applications,” Journal of Reliable Intelligent
Environments, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 177–188, 2017.
[154] F. Rahman, M. E. Hoque, and S. I. Ahamed, “Anonpri: A secure
anonymous private authentication protocol for rfid systems,” Information
Sciences, vol. 379, pp. 195–210, 2017.
[155] O. Ermis¸, S¸. Bahtiyar, E. Anarım, and M. U. C¸ag˘layan, “A key
agreement protocol with partial backward confidentiality,” Computer
Networks, vol. 129, pp. 159–177, 2017.
27
[156] P. K. Dhillon and S. Kalra, “A lightweight biometrics based remote
user authentication scheme for iot services,” Journal of Information
Security and Applications, vol. 34, pp. 255–270, 2017.
[157] S. Raza, H. Shafagh, K. Hewage, R. Hummen, and T. Voigt, “Lithe:
Lightweight secure coap for the internet of things,” IEEE Sensors
Journal, vol. 13, no. 10, pp. 3711–3720, 2013.
[158] J.-Y. Lee, W.-C. Lin, and Y.-H. Huang, “A lightweight authentication
protocol for internet of things,” in International Symposium on Next-
Generation Electronics (ISNE), pp. 1–2, IEEE, 2014.
[159] D. Garcia-Carrillo and R. Marin-Lopez, “Lightweight coap-based
bootstrapping service for the internet of things,” Sensors, vol. 16, no. 3,
p. 358, 2016.
[160] T. Heer, O. Garcia-Morchon, R. Hummen, S. L. Keoh, S. S. Kumar,
and K. Wehrle, “Security challenges in the ip-based internet of things,”
Wireless Personal Communications, vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 527–542, 2011.
[161] J. Granjal, E. Monteiro, and J. S. Silva, “Security for the internet of
things: a survey of existing protocols and open research issues,” IEEE
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1294–1312,
2015.
[162] Q. Guo, Y. Cui, X. Zou, and Q. Huang, “Generic construction of privacy-
preserving optimistic fair exchange protocols,” Journal of Internet
Services and Information Security (JISIS), vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 44–56,
2017.
[163] N. Accettura and G. Piro, “Optimal and secure protocols in the ietf 6tisch
communication stack,” in 23rd international symposium on Industrial
electronics (ISIE), pp. 1469–1474, IEEE, 2014.
[164] H. Syafruddin and A. S. J. Putra, “Performance analysis of using a
reliable transport layer protocol for transmitting eap message over
radius in inter-domain wlan roaming,” in International Conference on
Information and Communication Technology for the Muslim World
(ICT4M), pp. G1–G5, IEEE, 2010.
[165] M. Nakhjiri and M. Nakhjiri, AAA and network security for mobile
access: radius, diameter, EAP, PKI and IP mobility. John Wiley &
Sons, 2005.
[166] A. Alcaide, E. Palomar, J. Montero-Castillo, and A. Ribagorda,
“Anonymous authentication for privacy-preserving iot target-driven
applications,” computers & security, vol. 37, pp. 111–123, 2013.
[167] D. Evans and D. M. Eyers, “Efficient data tagging for managing privacy
in the internet of things,” in IEEE International Conference on Green
Computing and Communications (GreenCom), pp. 244–248, IEEE,
2012.
[168] A. Ukil, S. Bandyopadhyay, J. Joseph, V. Banahatti, and S. Lodha,
“Negotiation-based privacy preservation scheme in internet of things
platform,” in Proceedings of the First International Conference on
Security of Internet of Things, pp. 75–84, ACM, 2012.
[169] S. Pe´rez, D. Rotondi, D. Pedone, L. Straniero, M. J. Nu´n˜ez, and
F. Gigante, “Towards the cp-abe application for privacy-preserving
secure data sharing in iot contexts,” in International Conference on
Innovative Mobile and Internet Services in Ubiquitous Computing,
pp. 917–926, Springer, 2017.
[170] P. P. Jayaraman, X. Yang, A. Yavari, D. Georgakopoulos, and X. Yi,
“Privacy preserving internet of things: From privacy techniques to a
blueprint architecture and efficient implementation,” Future Generation
Computer Systems, vol. 76, pp. 540–549, 2017.
[171] S. Belguith, N. Kaaniche, M. Laurent, A. Jemai, and R. Attia, “Phoabe:
Securely outsourcing multi-authority attribute based encryption with
policy hidden for cloud assisted iot,” Computer Networks, vol. 133,
pp. 141–156, 2018.
[172] O. Bamasag, “A lightweight privacy and integrity preserving data
communication in smart grid,” European Journal of Computer Science
and Information Technology, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 21–30, 2015.
[173] C. Hu, J. Zhang, and Q. Wen, “An identity-based personal location
system with protected privacy in iot,” in 4th IEEE International
Conference on Broadband Network and Multimedia Technology (IC-
BNMT), pp. 192–195, IEEE, 2011.
[174] C. Doukas, I. Maglogiannis, V. Koufi, F. Malamateniou, and G. Vas-
silacopoulos, “Enabling data protection through pki encryption in iot
m-health devices,” in 12th International Conference on Bioinformatics
& Bioengineering (BIBE), pp. 25–29, IEEE, 2012.
[175] X. Wang, J. Zhang, E. M. Schooler, and M. Ion, “Performance evaluation
of attribute-based encryption: Toward data privacy in the iot,” in IEEE
International Conference on Communications (ICC), pp. 725–730, IEEE,
2014.
[176] D. Li, Z. Aung, J. Williams, and A. Sanchez, “P3: Privacy preservation
protocol for automatic appliance control application in smart grid,”
IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 414–429, 2014.
[177] H. Bao and L. Chen, “A lightweight privacy-preserving scheme
with data integrity for smart grid communications,” Concurrency and
Computation: Practice and Experience, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 1094–1110,
2016.
[178] H. Bao and R. Lu, “A new differentially private data aggregation with
fault tolerance for smart grid communications,” IEEE Internet of Things
Journal, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 248–258, 2015.
[179] T. Gong, H. Huang, P. Li, K. Zhang, and H. Jiang, “A medical healthcare
system for privacy protection based on iot,” in Seventh International
Symposium on Parallel Architectures, Algorithms and Programming
(PAAP), pp. 217–222, IEEE, 2015.
[180] R. Lu, K. Heung, A. H. Lashkari, and A. A. Ghorbani, “A lightweight
privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme for fog computing-enhanced
iot,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 3302–3312, 2017.
[181] S. Mascetti, C. Bettini, and D. Freni, “Longitude: Centralized privacy-
preserving computation of users proximity,” in Workshop on Secure
Data Management, pp. 142–157, Springer, 2009.
[182] I. D. Addo, S. I. Ahamed, S. S. Yau, and A. Buduru, “A reference
architecture for improving security and privacy in internet of things
applications,” in IEEE International Conference on Mobile Services
(MS), pp. 108–115, IEEE, 2014.
[183] “Spore.” http://www.lsv.fr/Software/spore/table.html [Last Accessed -
September 2018].
[184] E. Vasilomanolakis, J. Daubert, M. Luthra, V. Gazis, A. Wiesmaier, and
P. Kikiras, “On the security and privacy of internet of things architectures
and systems,” in International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things
(SIoT), pp. 49–57, IEEE, 2015.
[185] I. Alqassem and D. Svetinovic, “A taxonomy of security and privacy
requirements for the internet of things (iot),” in IEEE International
Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
(IEEM), pp. 1244–1248, IEEE, 2014.
[186] H. K. Patil and R. Seshadri, “Big data security and privacy issues in
healthcare,” in IEEE International Congress on Big Data (BigData
Congress), pp. 762–765, IEEE, 2014.
[187] E. Bertino, “Data security and privacy in the iot.,” in EDBT, vol. 2016,
pp. 1–3, 2016.
[188] C. Perera, R. Ranjan, L. Wang, S. U. Khan, and A. Y. Zomaya, “Big
data privacy in the internet of things era,” IT Professional, vol. 17,
no. 3, pp. 32–39, 2015.
[189] Y. H. Hwang, “Iot security & privacy: threats and challenges,” in
Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on IoT Privacy, Trust, and
Security, pp. 1–1, ACM, 2015.
[190] Z.-K. Zhang, M. C. Y. Cho, C.-W. Wang, C.-W. Hsu, C.-K. Chen, and
S. Shieh, “Iot security: ongoing challenges and research opportunities,”
in 7th International Conference on Service-Oriented Computing and
Applications (SOCA), pp. 230–234, IEEE, 2014.
[191] X. Jiang, X. Ge, J. Yu, F. Kong, X. Cheng, and R. Hao, “An efficient
symmetric searchable encryption scheme for cloud storage,” Journal
of Internet Services and Information Security (JISIS), vol. 7, no. 2,
pp. 1–18, 2017.
[192] A.-R. Sadeghi, C. Wachsmann, and M. Waidner, “Security and privacy
challenges in industrial internet of things,” in Proceedings of the 52nd
annual design automation conference, p. 54, ACM, 2015.
[193] A. F. Skarmeta, J. L. Hernandez-Ramos, and M. V. Moreno, “A
decentralized approach for security and privacy challenges in the internet
of things,” in World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT), pp. 67–72,
IEEE, 2014.
[194] X.-J. Lin, L. Sun, and H. Qu, “Insecurity of an anonymous authentication
for privacy-preserving iot target-driven applications,” computers &
security, vol. 48, pp. 142–149, 2015.
[195] M. R. Schurgot, D. A. Shinberg, and L. G. Greenwald, “Experiments
with security and privacy in iot networks,” in 16th International
Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks
(WoWMoM), pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2015.
[196] A. Campan and T. M. Truta, “Data and structural k-anonymity in social
networks,” in Privacy, Security, and Trust in KDD, pp. 33–54, Springer,
2009.
[197] J. Cheng, A. W.-c. Fu, and J. Liu, “K-isomorphism: privacy preserving
network publication against structural attacks,” in Proceedings of the
2010 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of data,
pp. 459–470, ACM, 2010.
[198] L. Zou, L. Chen, and M. T. O¨zsu, “K-automorphism: A general
framework for privacy preserving network publication,” Proceedings of
the VLDB Endowment, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 946–957, 2009.
[199] M. Abomhara and G. M. Køien, “Security and privacy in the internet
of things: Current status and open issues,” in International Conference
28
on Privacy and Security in Mobile Systems (PRISMS), pp. 1–8, IEEE,
2014.
[200] R. H. Weber, “Internet of things–new security and privacy challenges,”
Computer law & security review, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 23–30, 2010.
[201] D. Kozlov, J. Veijalainen, and Y. Ali, “Security and privacy threats in
iot architectures,” in Proceedings of the 7th International Conference
on Body Area Networks, pp. 256–262, ICST (Institute for Computer
Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering),
2012.
[202] A. Ukil, S. Bandyopadhyay, and A. Pal, “Privacy for iot: Involuntary
privacy enablement for smart energy systems,” in 2015 IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Communications (ICC), pp. 536–541, IEEE,
2015.
[203] A. Ukil, S. Bandyopadhyay, and A. Pal, “Iot-privacy: To be private or
not to be private,” in IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), pp. 123–124, IEEE, 2014.
[204] A. Dorri, S. S. Kanhere, R. Jurdak, and P. Gauravaram, “Blockchain
for iot security and privacy: The case study of a smart home,” in IEEE
International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Workshops (PerCom Workshops), pp. 618–623, IEEE, 2017.
[205] A. Abhishta, R. Joosten, and L. J. Nieuwenhuis, “Comparing alternatives
to measure the impact of ddos attack announcements on target stock
prices,” Journal of wireless mobile networks, ubiquitous computing, and
dependable applications, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 1–18, 2017.
[206] I. Kotenko, I. Saenko, and A. Kushnerevich, “Parallel big data processing
system for security monitoring in internet of things networks,” Journal
of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable
Applications, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 60–74, 2017.
[207] W. Zhou and S. Piramuthu, “Security/privacy of wearable fitness tracking
iot devices,” in 9th Iberian Conference on Information Systems and
Technologies (CISTI), pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2014.
[208] M. D. Alshehri and F. K. Hussain, “A centralized trust management
mechanism for the internet of things (ctm-iot),” in International
Conference on Broadband and Wireless Computing, Communication
and Applications, pp. 533–543, Springer, 2017.
[209] R. Chen, J. Guo, and F. Bao, “Trust management for soa-based iot and
its application to service composition,” IEEE Transactions on Services
Computing, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 482–495, 2016.
[210] X. Wu and F. Li, “A multi-domain trust management model for
supporting rfid applications of iot,” PloS one, vol. 12, no. 7, p. e0181124,
2017.
[211] J. Guo, R. Chen, and J. J. Tsai, “A mobile cloud hierarchical trust
management protocol for iot systems,” in 5th IEEE International
Conference on Mobile Cloud Computing, Services, and Engineering
(MobileCloud), pp. 125–130, IEEE, 2017.
[212] N. Peshwe and D. Das, “Algorithm for trust based policy hidden
communication in the internet of things,” in 42nd Conference on Local
Computer Networks Workshops (LCN Workshops), pp. 148–153, IEEE,
2017.
[213] S. Ziegler, A. Skarmeta, J. Bernal, E. E. Kim, and S. Bianchi, “Anastacia:
Advanced networked agents for security and trust assessment in cps iot
architectures,” in Global Internet of Things Summit (GIoTS), pp. 1–6,
IEEE, 2017.
[214] R. K. Chahal and S. Singh, “Fuzzy rule-based expert system for
determining trustworthiness of cloud service providers,” International
Journal of Fuzzy Systems, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 338–354, 2017.
[215] P. N. Mahalle, P. A. Thakre, N. R. Prasad, and R. Prasad, “A fuzzy
approach to trust based access control in internet of things,” in
3rd International Conference on Wireless Communications, Vehicular
Technology, Information Theory and Aerospace & Electronic Systems
(VITAE), pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2013.
[216] H. Son, N. Kang, B. Gwak, and D. Lee, “An adaptive iot trust estimation
scheme combining interaction history and stereotypical reputation,”
in 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications & Networking
Conference (CCNC), pp. 349–352, IEEE, 2017.
[217] V. Sharma, I. You, R. Kumar, and P. Kim, “Computational offloading
for efficient trust management in pervasive online social networks using
osmotic computing,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 5084–5103, 2017.
[218] D. Chen, G. Chang, D. Sun, J. Li, J. Jia, and X. Wang, “Trm-iot:
A trust management model based on fuzzy reputation for internet of
things,” Computer Science and Information Systems, vol. 8, no. 4,
pp. 1207–1228, 2011.
[219] Z. A. Khan, J. Ullrich, A. G. Voyiatzis, and P. Herrmann, “A trust-based
resilient routing mechanism for the internet of things,” in Proceedings
of the 12th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and
Security, p. 27, ACM, 2017.
[220] K. Kravari and N. Bassiliades, “Ordain: An ontology for trust man-
agement in the internet of things,” in OTM Confederated International
Conferences On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems, pp. 216–223,
Springer, 2017.
[221] I. Santos, F. Brezo, X. Ugarte-Pedrero, and P. G. Bringas, “Opcode
sequences as representation of executables for data-mining-based
unknown malware detection,” Information Sciences, vol. 231, pp. 64–82,
2013.
[222] R. Zhou, J. Pan, X. Tan, and H. Xi, “Application of clips expert
system to malware detection system,” in International Conference on
Computational Intelligence and Security, vol. 1, pp. 309–314, IEEE,
2008.
[223] A. Niki, “Drive-by download attacks: Effects and detection methods,”
in 3rd IT Security Conference for the Next Generation, 2009.
[224] F. Gai, J. Zhang, P. Zhu, and X. Jiang, “Multidimensional trust-
based anomaly detection system in internet of things,” in International
Conference on Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications, pp. 302–
313, Springer, 2017.
[225] J. Wang, R. Chen, J. J. Tsai, and D.-C. Wang, “Trust-based mechanism
design for cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks,”
Computer Communications, vol. 116, pp. 90–100, 2018.
[226] M. M. Ozcelik, E. Irmak, and S. Ozdemir, “A hybrid trust based
intrusion detection system for wireless sensor networks,” in International
Symposium on Networks, Computers and Communications (ISNCC),
pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2017.
[227] M. F. Hinarejos, F. Almena´rez, P. Arias-Cabarcos, J.-L. Ferrer-Gomila,
and A. Marı´n, “Risklaine: A probabilistic approach for assessing risk in
certificate-based security,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, 2018.
[228] A. A. Obaidi and E. W. Yocam, “Persona and device based certificate
management,” July 6 2017. US Patent App. 14/985,273.
[229] S. Namal, H. Gamaarachchi, G. MyoungLee, and T.-W. Um, “Autonomic
trust management in cloud-based and highly dynamic iot applications,”
in ITU Kaleidoscope: Trust in the Information Society (K-2015), pp. 1–8,
IEEE, 2015.
[230] M. Nitti, R. Girau, L. Atzori, A. Iera, and G. Morabito, “A subjective
model for trustworthiness evaluation in the social internet of things,” in
23rd International Symposium on Personal Indoor and Mobile Radio
Communications (PIMRC), pp. 18–23, IEEE, 2012.
[231] N. A. Mhetre, A. V. Deshpande, and P. N. Mahalle, “Trust management
model based on fuzzy approach for ubiquitous computing,” International
Journal of Ambient Computing and Intelligence (IJACI), vol. 7, no. 2,
pp. 33–46, 2016.
[232] M. Nitti, R. Girau, and L. Atzori, “Trustworthiness management in the
social internet of things,” IEEE Transactions on knowledge and data
engineering, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 1253–1266, 2014.
[233] G. Lize, W. Jingpei, and S. Bin, “Trust management mechanism for
internet of things,” China Communications, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 148–156,
2014.
[234] J. Duan, D. Gao, D. Yang, C. H. Foh, and H.-H. Chen, “An energy-
aware trust derivation scheme with game theoretic approach in wireless
sensor networks for iot applications,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal,
vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 58–69, 2014.
[235] R. Chen, J. Guo, and F. Bao, “Trust management for service composition
in soa-based iot systems,” in Wireless Communications and Networking
Conference (WCNC), pp. 3444–3449, IEEE, 2014.
[236] J. P. Wang, S. Bin, Y. Yu, and X. X. Niu, “Distributed trust management
mechanism for the internet of things,” in Applied Mechanics and
Materials, vol. 347, pp. 2463–2467, Trans Tech Publ, 2013.
[237] Y. B. Saied, A. Olivereau, D. Zeghlache, and M. Laurent, “Trust
management system design for the internet of things: A context-aware
and multi-service approach,” Computers & Security, vol. 39, pp. 351–
365, 2013.
[238] F. Bao and R. Chen, “Trust management for the internet of things and
its application to service composition,” in International Symposium on
a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM),
pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2012.
[239] F. Bao and I.-R. Chen, “Dynamic trust management for internet of
things applications,” in Proceedings of the 2012 international workshop
on Self-aware internet of things, pp. 1–6, ACM, 2012.
[240] R. Liu and W. Trappe, Securing wireless communications at the physical
layer, vol. 7. Springer, 2010.
[241] I. U. Zaman, A. B. Lopez, M. A. Al Faruque, and O. Boyraz,
“Polarization mode dispersion-based physical layer key generation for
optical fiber link security,” in Optical Sensors, pp. JTu4A–20, Optical
Society of America, 2017.
29
[242] Q. Xu, P. Ren, H. Song, and Q. Du, “Security enhancement for iot
communications exposed to eavesdroppers with uncertain locations,”
IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 2840–2853, 2016.
[243] B. Chen, C. Zhu, L. Shu, M. Su, J. Wei, V. C. Leung, and J. J. Rodrigues,
“Securing uplink transmission for lightweight single-antenna ues in
the presence of a massive mimo eavesdropper,” IEEE Access, vol. 4,
pp. 5374–5384, 2016.
[244] G. Zhang and H. Sun, “Secure distributed detection under energy
constraint in iot-oriented sensor networks,” Sensors, vol. 16, no. 12,
p. 2152, 2016.
[245] H. Hu, Z. Gao, X. Liao, and V. Leung, “Secure communications in ciot
networks with a wireless energy harvesting untrusted relay,” Sensors,
vol. 17, no. 9, p. 2023, 2017.
[246] S. N. Islam, M. A. Mahmud, and A. Oo, “Secured communication
among iot devices in the presence of cellular interference,” in VTC2017-
Spring: Light up vehicular innovation: Proceedings of the 85th Vehicular
Technology Conference, pp. 1–6, Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, 2017.
[247] J. Choi, “Physical layer security for channel-aware random access with
opportunistic jamming,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, vol. 12, no. 11, pp. 2699–2711, 2017.
[248] L. Hu, H. Wen, B. Wu, F. Pan, R.-F. Liao, H. Song, J. Tang, and X. Wang,
“Cooperative jamming for physical layer security enhancement in internet
of things,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2017.
[249] Z. Li, T. Jing, L. Ma, Y. Huo, and J. Qian, “Worst-case cooperative
jamming for secure communications in ciot networks,” Sensors, vol. 16,
no. 3, p. 339, 2016.
[250] D. Wei, L. Liang, M. Zhang, R. Qiao, and W. Huang, “A polarization
state modulation based physical layer security scheme for wireless
communications,” in Military Communications Conference, MILCOM,
pp. 1195–1201, IEEE, 2016.
[251] Z. Gao, H. Hu, D. Cheng, J. Xu, and X. Sun, “Physical layer security
based on artificial noise and spatial modulation,” in 8th International
Conference on Wireless Communications & Signal Processing (WCSP),
pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2016.
[252] Y. Li, T. Jiang, and J. Huang, “Compressed sensing method for secret
key generation based on mimo channel estimation,” in The Proceedings
of the Third International Conference on Communications, Signal
Processing, and Systems, pp. 419–428, Springer, 2015.
[253] A. Limmanee and W. Henkel, “Secure physical-layer key generation
protocol and key encoding in wireless communications,” in GLOBECOM
Workshops (GC Wkshps), pp. 94–98, IEEE, 2010.
[254] W. Trappe, “The challenges facing physical layer security,” IEEE
communications magazine, vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 16–20, 2015.
[255] A. Mukherjee, “Physical-layer security in the internet of things:
Sensing and communication confidentiality under resource constraints,”
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 103, no. 10, pp. 1747–1761, 2015.
[256] T. Pecorella, L. Brilli, and L. Mucchi, “The role of physical layer
security in iot: A novel perspective,” Information, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 49,
2016.
[257] J. Zhang, T. Q. Duong, R. Woods, and A. Marshall, “Securing wireless
communications of the internet of things from the physical layer, an
overview,” Entropy, vol. 19, no. 8, p. 420, 2017.
[258] A. Kitana, I. Traore, and I. Woungang, “Impact study of a mobile botnet
over lte networks.,” J. Internet Serv. Inf. Secur., vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 1–22,
2016.
[259] K. Zeng, “Physical layer key generation in wireless networks: challenges
and opportunities,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 53, no. 6,
pp. 33–39, 2015.
[260] D. Altolini, V. Lakkundi, N. Bui, C. Tapparello, and M. Rossi, “Low
power link layer security for iot: Implementation and performance
analysis,” in 9th International Wireless Communications and Mobile
Computing Conference (IWCMC), pp. 919–925, IEEE, 2013.
[261] C. Lee, L. Zappaterra, K. Choi, and H.-A. Choi, “Securing smart home:
Technologies, security challenges, and security requirements,” in IEEE
Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS), pp. 67–72,
IEEE, 2014.
[262] L. Brilli, T. Pecorella, and L. Mucchi, “Physical layer security for iot
devices configuration and key management-a proof of concept,” in AEIT
International Annual Conference (AEIT), pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2016.
[263] J.-H. Lee, J.-M. Bonnin, and X. Lagrange, “Host-based distributed
mobility management support protocol for ipv6 mobile networks,”
in 8th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing,
Networking and Communications (WiMob), pp. 61–68, IEEE, 2012.
[264] J.-H. Lee, J.-M. Bonnin, P. Seite, and H. A. Chan, “Distributed ip
mobility management from the perspective of the ietf: motivations,
requirements, approaches, comparison, and challenges,” IEEE Wireless
Communications, vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 159–168, 2013.
[265] B. S. Ghahfarokhi and N. MOVAHHEDINIA, “Context gathering and
management for centralized context-aware handover in heterogeneous
mobile networks,” Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering & Com-
puter Sciences, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 914–933, 2012.
[266] V. Sharma, I. You, F. Palmieri, D. N. K. Jayakody, and J. Li,
“Secure and energy efficient handover in fog networks using
blockchain-based dmm,” IEEE Communications Magazine, pp. 2–11,
10.1109/MCOM.2018.1700863, 2018.
[267] H.-S. Chai, J. Jeong, and C.-H. Cho, “Security analysis of fast inter-lma
domain handover scheme in proxy mobile ipv6 networks,” Pervasive
and Mobile Computing, vol. 39, pp. 100–116, 2017.
[268] H.-S. Chai, J.-Y. Choi, and J. Jeong, “An enhanced secure mobility
management scheme for building iot applications,” Procedia Computer
Science, vol. 56, pp. 586–591, 2015.
[269] B. Ndibanje, K. Kim, Y. Kang, H. Kim, T. Kim, and H. Lee, “A secure
and efficient mutual authentication hand-off protocol for sensor device
support in internet of things,” Sensors and Materials, vol. 29, no. 7,
pp. 953–960, 2017.
[270] N. Saxena, S. Grijalva, and N. S. Chaudhari, “Authentication protocol for
an iot-enabled lte network,” ACM Transactions on Internet Technology
(TOIT), vol. 16, no. 4, p. 25, 2016.
[271] J. Cao, M. Ma, and H. Li, “An uniform handover authentication between
e-utran and non-3gpp access networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 11, no. 10, pp. 3644–3650, 2012.
[272] Z. Haddad, M. Mahmoud, I. A. Saroit, and S. Taha, “Secure and
efficient uniform handover scheme for lte-a networks,” in Wireless
Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), 2016 IEEE,
pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2016.
[273] M.-S. Chiang, C.-M. Huang, P. B. Chau, S. Xu, H. Zhou, and
D. Ren, “A forward fast media independent handover control scheme for
proxy mobile ipv6 (ffmih-pmipv6) over heterogeneous wireless mobile
network,” Telecommunication Systems, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 699–715,
2017.
[274] H. Ameur, M. Esseghir, L. Khoukhi, and L. Merghem-Boulahia,
“Enhanced mih (media independent handover) for collaborative green
wireless communications,” International Journal of Communication
Systems, vol. 30, no. 7, 2017.
[275] S. Raza, S. Duquennoy, J. Ho¨glund, U. Roedig, and T. Voigt, “Secure
communication for the internet of thingsa comparison of link-layer
security and ipsec for 6lowpan,” Security and Communication Networks,
vol. 7, no. 12, pp. 2654–2668, 2014.
[276] J. Swetina, G. Lu, P. Jacobs, F. Ennesser, and J. Song, “Toward a
standardized common m2m service layer platform: Introduction to
onem2m,” IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 20–26,
2014.
[277] A. Rajaram, D. N. K. Jayakody, K. Srinivasan, B. Chen, and V. Sharma,
“Opportunistic-harvesting: Rf wireless power transfer scheme for
multiple access relays system,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 16084–16099,
2017.
[278] M. Centenaro, L. Vangelista, A. Zanella, and M. Zorzi, “Long-range
communications in unlicensed bands: The rising stars in the iot and
smart city scenarios,” IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 23, no. 5,
pp. 60–67, 2016.
[279] M. Khan, S. Din, M. Gohar, A. Ahmad, S. Cuomo, F. Piccialli, and
G. Jeon, “Enabling multimedia aware vertical handover management in
internet of things based heterogeneous wireless networks,” Multimedia
Tools and Applications, vol. 76, no. 24, pp. 25919–25941, 2017.
[280] H. Ju and Y. Yoo, “Efficient packet transmission utilizing vertical
handover in iot environment,” Journal of KIISE, vol. 42, no. 6, pp. 807–
816, 2015.
[281] J. E. Luzuriaga, J. C. Cano, C. Calafate, P. Manzoni, M. Perez, and
P. Boronat, “Handling mobility in iot applications using the mqtt
protocol,” in Internet Technologies and Applications (ITA), pp. 245–250,
IEEE, 2015.
[282] A. J. J. Valera, M. A. Zamora, and A. F. Skarmeta, “An architecture
based on internet of things to support mobility and security in medical
environments,” in 7th IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking
Conference (CCNC), pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2010.
[283] A. S. Gaur, J. Budakoti, C.-H. Lung, and A. Redmond, “Iot-equipped uav
communications with seamless vertical handover,” in IEEE Conference
on Dependable and Secure Computing, pp. 459–465, IEEE, 2017.
[284] K.-D. Baek and I.-Y. Ko, “Spatially cohesive service discovery and
dynamic service handover for distributed iot environments,” in Interna-
tional Conference on Web Engineering, pp. 60–78, Springer, 2017.
30
[285] T. Li, H. Zhou, H. Luo, I. You, and Q. Xu, “Sat-flow: multi-strategy
flow table management for software defined satellite networks,” IEEE
Access, vol. 5, pp. 14952–14965, 2017.
[286] J.-H. Lee, J.-M. Bonnin, I. You, and T.-M. Chung, “Comparative
handover performance analysis of ipv6 mobility management protocols,”
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 1077–
1088, 2013.
[287] V. Sharma, J. D. Lim, J. N. Kim, and I. You, “Saca: Self-aware
communication architecture for iot using mobile fog servers,” Mobile
Information Systems, vol. 2017, 2017.
[288] R. A. Khan and A. Mir, “Sensor fast proxy mobile ipv6 (sfpmipv6)-
a framework for mobility supported ip-wsn for improving qos and
building iot,” in International Conference on Communications and
Signal Processing (ICCSP), pp. 1593–1598, IEEE, 2014.
[289] L. Chen, S. Thombre, K. Jarvinen, E. S. Lohan, A. Alen-Savikko,
H. Leppakoski, M. Z. H. Bhuiyan, S. Bu-Pasha, G. N. Ferrara,
S. Honkala, et al., “Robustness, security and privacy in location-based
services for future iot: A survey,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 8956–8977,
2017.
[290] L. Ni, Y. Yuan, X. Wang, M. Zhang, and J. Zhang, “A location privacy
preserving scheme based on repartitioning anonymous region in mobile
social network,” Procedia Computer Science, vol. 129, pp. 368–371,
2018.
[291] G. Han, H. Wang, J. Jiang, W. Zhang, and S. Chan, “Caslp: A confused
arc-based source location privacy protection scheme in wsns for iot,”
IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 56, no. 9, pp. 42–47, 2018.
[292] S. Zakhary and A. Benslimane, “On location-privacy in opportunis-
tic mobile networks, a survey,” Journal of Network and Computer
Applications, vol. 103, pp. 157–170, 2018.
[293] D. Liao, G. Sun, H. Li, H. Yu, and V. Chang, “The framework and
algorithm for preserving user trajectory while using location-based
services in iot-cloud systems,” Cluster Computing, vol. 20, no. 3,
pp. 2283–2297, 2017.
[294] S. Mirzamohammadi, J. A. Chen, A. A. Sani, S. Mehrotra, and
G. Tsudik, “Ditio: Trustworthy auditing of sensor activities in mobile &
iot devices,” in Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Embedded
Network Sensor Systems, p. 28, ACM, 2017.
[295] T. Mao, C. Cao, X. Peng, and W. Han, “A privacy preserving data
aggregation scheme to investigate apps installment in massive mobile
devices,” Procedia Computer Science, vol. 129, pp. 331–340, 2018.
[296] Y. Wang, Z. Cai, X. Tong, Y. Gao, and G. Yin, “Truthful incentive
mechanism with location privacy-preserving for mobile crowdsourcing
systems,” Computer Networks, vol. 135, pp. 32–43, 2018.
[297] I. Ullah, M. A. Shah, A. Wahid, A. Mehmood, and H. Song, “Esot: a
new privacy model for preserving location privacy in internet of things,”
Telecommunication Systems, vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 553–575, 2018.
[298] G. Sun, V. Chang, M. Ramachandran, Z. Sun, G. Li, H. Yu, and D. Liao,
“Efficient location privacy algorithm for internet of things (iot) services
and applications,” Journal of Network and Computer Applications,
vol. 89, pp. 3–13, 2017.
[299] V. Sharma, J. Kim, S. Kwon, I. You, and F.-Y. Leu, “An overview of
802.21a-2012 and its incorporation into iot-fog networks using osmotic
framework,” in 3rd EAI International Conference on IoT as a Service,
pp. 1–6, EAI, 2017.
[300] V. Sharma, J. Kim, S. Kwon, I. You, and H.-C. Chen, “Fuzzy-based
protocol for secure remote diagnosis of iot devices in 5g networks,” in
3rd EAI International Conference on IoT as a Service, pp. 1–6, EAI,
2017.
[301] R. Roman, J. Lopez, and M. Mambo, “Mobile edge computing, fog et
al.: A survey and analysis of security threats and challenges,” Future
Generation Computer Systems, vol. 78, pp. 680–698, 2018.
[302] M. B. Mollah, M. A. K. Azad, and A. Vasilakos, “Security and privacy
challenges in mobile cloud computing: Survey and way ahead,” Journal
of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 84, pp. 38–54, 2017.
[303] M. R. Palattella, M. Dohler, A. Grieco, G. Rizzo, J. Torsner, T. Engel,
and L. Ladid, “Internet of things in the 5g era: Enablers, architecture, and
business models,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 510–527, 2016.
[304] H. Lin and N. W. Bergmann, “Iot privacy and security challenges for
smart home environments,” Information, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 44, 2016.
[305] A. Al-Fuqaha, M. Guizani, M. Mohammadi, M. Aledhari, and
M. Ayyash, “Internet of things: A survey on enabling technologies,
protocols, and applications,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 2347–2376, 2015.
[306] S. L. Keoh, S. S. Kumar, and H. Tschofenig, “Securing the internet of
things: A standardization perspective,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal,
vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 265–275, 2014.
[307] H.-C. Lee and K.-H. Ke, “Monitoring of large-area iot sensors using
a lora wireless mesh network system: Design and evaluation,” IEEE
Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement, 2018.
[308] G. T. Garcia, V. M. Sanchez, C. N. L. Marin, J. I. Cortez, C. A. R.
Acevedo, G. S. Gonzalez, J. L. H. Ameca, and M. d. C. M. Garcia,
“Wireless sensor network for monitoring physical variables applied to
green technology (iot green technology),” European Journal of Electrical
Engineering and Computer Science, vol. 2, no. 2, 2018.
[309] H. Wang, Z. Chen, J. Zhao, X. Di, and D. Liu, “A vulnerability
assessment method in industrial internet of things based on attack
graph and maximum flow,” IEEE ACCESS, vol. 6, pp. 8599–8609,
2018.
[310] V. Sharma, J. Kim, S. Kwon, I. You, K. Lee, and K. Yim, “A framework
for mitigating zero-day attacks in iot,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.05549,
2018.
[311] A. Abeshu and N. Chilamkurti, “Deep learning: The frontier for
distributed attack detection in fog-to-things computing,” IEEE Commu-
nications Magazine, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 169–175, 2018.
[312] A. G. P. Lobato, M. A. Lopez, I. SANZ, A. A. Cardenas, O. C. M.
Duarte, and G. Pujolle, “An adaptive real-time architecture for zero-day
threat detection,” in International Conference on Communications-ICC,
pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2018.
[313] B. D. Weinberg, G. R. Milne, Y. G. Andonova, and F. M. Hajjat,
“Internet of things: Convenience vs. privacy and secrecy,” Business
Horizons, vol. 58, no. 6, pp. 615–624, 2015.
[314] I. You and K. Yim, “Malware obfuscation techniques: A brief sur-
vey,” in International Conference on Broadband, Wireless Computing,
Communication and Applications (BWCCA), pp. 297–300, IEEE, 2010.
[315] S.-Y. Lee, S.-r. Wi, E. Seo, J.-K. Jung, and T.-M. Chung, “Profiot:
Abnormal behavior profiling (abp) of iot devices based on a machine
learning approach,” in Telecommunication Networks and Applications
Conference (ITNAC), 2017 27th International, pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2017.
[316] T. M. Shaashua and O. Shaashua, “Physical environment profiling
through internet of things integration platform,” Jan. 16 2018. US
Patent 9,871,865.
[317] H. Al-Hamadi and R. Chen, “Trust-based decision making for health iot
systems,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 4, no. 5, pp. 1408–1419,
2017.
[318] O. B. Abderrahim, M. H. Elhdhili, and L. Saidane, “Tmcoi-siot: A trust
management system based on communities of interest for the social
internet of things,” in 13th International Wireless Communications and
Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC), pp. 747–752, IEEE, 2017.
[319] Z. A. Khan and P. Herrmann, “A trust based distributed intrusion
detection mechanism for internet of things,” in IEEE 31st International
Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications
(AINA), pp. 1169–1176, IEEE, 2017.
[320] J. A. Oravec, “Emerging cyber hygiene practices for the internet of
things (iot): Professional issues in consulting clients and educating
users on iot privacy and security,” in IEEE International Professional
Communication Conference (ProComm), pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2017.
[321] A. Chowdhury, “Cyber attacks in mechatronics systems based on internet
of things,” in IEEE International Conference on Mechatronics (ICM),
pp. 476–481, IEEE, 2017.
[322] I. Chochliouros, S. Ziegler, L. Bolognini, N. Alonistioti, M. Stamatelatos,
P. Kontopoulos, G. Mourikas, V. Vlachos, N. Gligoric, and M. Holst,
“Enabling crowd-sourcing-based privacy risk assessment in eu: the
privacy flag project,” in Proceedings of the 21st Pan-Hellenic Conference
on Informatics, p. 31, ACM, 2017.
[323] R. Jiang, J. Luo, and X. Wang, “An attack tree based risk assessment
for location privacy in wireless sensor networks,” in 8th International
Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile
Computing (WiCOM), pp. 1–4, IEEE, 2012.
[324] R. Zheng, M. Zhang, Q. Wu, C. Yang, W. Wei, D. Zhang, and Z. Ma, “An
iot security risk autonomic assessment algorithm,” Indonesian Journal
of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 819–
826, 2013.
[325] C.-H. Liao, H.-H. Shuai, and L.-C. Wang, “Eavesdropping prevention
for heterogeneous internet of things systems,” in 15th Annual Consumer
Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC), pp. 1–2, IEEE,
2018.
[326] D. Soldani, Y. J. Guo, B. Barani, P. Mogensen, I. Chih-Lin, and S. K.
Das, “5g for ultra-reliable low-latency communications,” IEEE Network,
vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 6–7, 2018.
[327] S. Sen, J. Koo, and S. Bagchi, “Trifecta: Security, energy efficiency,
and communication capacity comparison for wireless iot devices,” IEEE
Internet Computing, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 74–81, 2018.
31
[328] X. Tang, P. Ren, and Z. Han, “Jamming mitigation via hierarchical
security game for iot communications,” IEEE Access, 2018.
[329] B. L. Parne, S. Gupta, and N. S. Chaudhari, “Segb: Security enhanced
group based aka protocol for m2m communication in an iot enabled
lte/lte-a network,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 3668–3684, 2018.
[330] N.-N. Dao, Y. Kim, S. Jeong, M. Park, and S. Cho, “Achievable multi-
security levels for lightweight iot-enabled devices in infrastructureless
peer-aware communications,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 26743–26753,
2017.
[331] M. Mangia, F. Pareschi, R. Rovatti, and G. Setti, “Low-cost security of
iot sensor nodes with rakeness-based compressed sensing: Statistical and
known-plaintext attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 327–340, 2018.
[332] J. Wang, Z. Hong, Y. Zhang, and Y. Jin, “Enabling security-enhanced
attestation with intel sgx for remote terminal and iot,” IEEE Transactions
on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, vol. 37,
no. 1, pp. 88–96, 2018.
[333] H. Sedjelmaci, S. M. Senouci, and T. Taleb, “An accurate security
game for low-resource iot devices,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technology, vol. 66, no. 10, pp. 9381–9393, 2017.
[334] R. Giuliano, F. Mazzenga, A. Neri, and A. M. Vegni, “Security access
protocols in iot capillary networks,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal,
vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 645–657, 2017.
[335] W. Yu and S. Ko¨se, “A lightweight masked aes implementation for
securing iot against cpa attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits and
Systems I: Regular Papers, vol. 64, no. 11, pp. 2934–2944, 2017.
[336] T. Ulz, T. Pieber, A. Ho¨ller, S. Haas, and C. Steger, “Secured and
easy-to-use nfc-based device configuration for the internet of things,”
IEEE Journal of Radio Frequency Identification, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 75–84,
2017.
[337] G. Xu, Y. Cao, Y. Ren, X. Li, and Z. Feng, “Network security situation
awareness based on semantic ontology and user-defined rules for internet
of things,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 21046–21056, 2017.
[338] E. Luo, M. Z. A. Bhuiyan, G. Wang, M. A. Rahman, J. Wu, and
M. Atiquzzaman, “Privacyprotector: Privacy-protected patient data
collection in iot-based healthcare systems,” IEEE Communications
Magazine, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 163–168, 2018.
[339] H. C. Po¨hls, V. Angelakis, S. Suppan, K. Fischer, G. Oikonomou,
E. Z. Tragos, R. D. Rodriguez, and T. Mouroutis, “Rerum: Building a
reliable iot upon privacy-and security-enabled smart objects,” in Wireless
Communications and Networking Conference Workshops (WCNCW),
pp. 122–127, IEEE, 2014.
[340] V. Sivaraman, H. H. Gharakheili, A. Vishwanath, R. Boreli, and
O. Mehani, “Network-level security and privacy control for smart-home
iot devices,” in 11th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile
Computing, Networking and Communications (WiMob), pp. 163–167,
IEEE, 2015.
[341] K. Wrona, A. de Castro, and B. Vasilache, “Data-centric security in
military applications of commercial iot technology,” in 3rd World Forum
on Internet of Things (WF-IoT), pp. 239–244, IEEE, 2016.
[342] S. A. M. Yusof, N. Zakaria, and N. A. R. Muton, “Timely trust: The use
of iot and cultural effects on swift trust formation within global virtual
teams,” in 8th International Conference on Information Technology
(ICIT), pp. 297–303, IEEE, 2017.
[343] Q. Xu, P. Ren, H. Song, and Q. Du, “Security-aware waveforms for
enhancing wireless communications privacy in cyber-physical systems
via multipath receptions,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 4, no. 6,
pp. 1924–1933, 2017.
[344] R. M. Lopez, A. Dutta, Y. Ohba, H. Schulzrinne, and A. F. G. Skarmeta,
“Network-layer assisted mechanism to optimize authentication delay
during handoff in 802.11 networks,” in Fourth Annual International
Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Networking & Services,
pp. 1–8, IEEE, 2007.
[345] Y. He and D. Perkins, “Bash: A backhaul-aided seamless handoff
scheme for wireless mesh networks,” in International Symposium on a
World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks, pp. 1–8, IEEE,
2008.
[346] A. Fu, Y. Zhang, Z. Zhu, Q. Jing, and J. Feng, “An efficient handover
authentication scheme with privacy preservation for ieee 802.16 m
network,” Computers & Security, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 741–749, 2012.
[347] Y. Zhang, X. Chen, J. Li, and H. Li, “Generic construction for secure
and efficient handoff authentication schemes in eap-based wireless
networks,” Computer Networks, vol. 75, pp. 192–211, 2014.
[348] H.-Y. Chien, T.-H. Hsu, and Y.-L. Tang, “Fast pre-authentication with
minimized overhead and high security for wlan handoff,” WSEAS
Transactions on Computers, no. 2, pp. 46–51, 2008.
[349] J. Choi and S. Jung, “A handover authentication using credentials based
on chameleon hashing,” IEEE communications letters, vol. 14, no. 1,
pp. 54–56, 2010.
[350] A. A. Al Shidhani and V. C. Leung, “Fast and secure reauthentications
for 3gpp subscribers during wimax-wlan handovers,” IEEE transactions
on dependable and secure computing, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 699–713, 2011.
[351] M. Kalong, S. Ngamsuriyaroj, and V. Visoottiviseth, “Dynamic key
management for secure continuous handoff in wireless lan,” in 6th
Workshop on Secure Network Protocols (NPSec), pp. 7–12, IEEE, 2010.
[352] N. Saxena and A. Roy, “Novel framework for proactive handover with
seamless multimedia over wlans,” IET communications, vol. 5, no. 9,
pp. 1204–1212, 2011.
[353] Q. Jing, Y. Zhang, A. Fu, and X. Liu, “A privacy preserving handover
authentication scheme for eap-based wireless networks,” in Global
Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM 2011), pp. 1–6, IEEE,
2011.
[354] T. N. Nguyen and M. Ma, “Enhanced eap-based pre-authentication for
fast and secure inter-asn handovers in mobile wimax networks,” IEEE
transactions on wireless communications, vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 2173–2181,
2012.
[355] C. Lai, H. Li, X. Liang, R. Lu, K. Zhang, and X. Shen, “Cpal: A
conditional privacy-preserving authentication with access linkability
for roaming service,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 1, no. 1,
pp. 46–57, 2014.
[356] H.-Y. Chien and T.-H. Hsu, “Secure fast wlan handoff using time-bound
delegated authentication,” International Journal of Communication
Systems, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 565–584, 2009.
[357] C. Ma, K. Xue, and P. Hong, “A proxy signature based re-authentication
scheme for secure fast handoff in wireless mesh networks.,” IJ Network
Security, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 122–132, 2013.
[358] D. He, J. Bu, S. Chan, and C. Chen, “Handauth: Efficient handover
authentication with conditional privacy for wireless networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Computers, vol. 62, no. 3, pp. 616–622, 2013.
[359] C. Wang, M. Ma, and L. Zhang, “An efficient eap-based pre-
authentication for inter-wran handover in tv white space,” IEEE Access,
vol. 5, pp. 9785–9796, 2017.
[360] J. Cao, H. Li, M. Ma, and F. Li, “Ugha: Uniform group-based handover
authentication for mtc within e-utran in lte-a networks,” in International
Conference on Communications (ICC), pp. 7246–7251, IEEE, 2015.
[361] Q. Kong, R. Lu, S. Chen, and H. Zhu, “Achieve secure handover session
key management via mobile relay in lte-advanced networks,” IEEE
Internet of Things Journal, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 29–39, 2017.
[362] S. Feirer and T. Sauter, “Seamless handover in industrial wlan using ieee
802.11 k,” in 26th International Symposium on Industrial Electronics
(ISIE), pp. 1234–1239, IEEE, 2017.
32
APPENDIX
TABLE II
ABBREVIATIONS AND KEY TERMS.
Abbreviation Full Form Abbreviation Full Form
ACL2 A Computational Logic for Applicative Common Lisp NFV Network Function Virtualization
AP Access Point OMA-DM Open Mobile Alliance-Device Management
AMQP Advanced Message Queuing Protocol PKI Public Key Infrastructure
AR/VR Augmented Reality/Virtual Reality PWD Password
AKA Authentication and Key Agreement P2MP Peer to Multi Peers
AKA’ Authentication and Key Agreement Prime P2P Peer to Peer
AS Authentication Server PSK Pre-Shared Key
AAA Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting PANA Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access
AVISPA Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications PMIPv6 Proxy Mobile IPv6
BAN BurrowsAbadiNeedham QoE Quality of Experience
CSI Channel State Information QoS Quality of Service
CoAP Constrained Application Protocol RPMA Random Phase Multiple Access
CPS Cyber-Physical Systems RSSI Received Signal Strength Indicator
DoS Denial of Service RADIUS Remote Access Dial In User Service
D2D Device to Device RPL Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service RFID Radio-frequency identification
DNS-SD Domain Name Server-Service Discovery SFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol
EKE Encrypted Key Exchange SPAM Secure Password Authentication Mechanism
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol SSL Secure Sockets Layer
GTC Generic Token Card SPFP Security Protocol for Fast PMIPv6
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications SOA Service Oriented Architecture
HOTA Handover Optimized Ticket-based Authentication SIP Session Initiation Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure SIR Signal-to-Interference Ratio
IP Internet Protocol SINR Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio
6LoWPAN IPv6 and Low-power Wireless Personal Area Network SDN Software Defined Network
LoRaWAN Long Range Wide Area Network SQL Structured Query Language
LEAP Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol TR-069 Technical Report -069
LTE-A Long Term Evolution- Advanced TA Ticket-based authentication
LTE-M Long Term Evolution for Machines TCP Transmission Control Protocol
LPWAN Low Power Wide Area Network TLS Transport Layer Security
M2M Machine to Machine TTLS Tunneled Transport Layer Security
MD Message Digest UNB-IoT Ultra Narrow Band Internet of Things
MQTT Message Queuing Telemetry Transport UDP User Datagram Protocol
M-IoT Mobile Internet of Things WEIGHTLESS-N Weightless-Narrow band
MIMO Multi-Input Multi-Output WEIGHTLESS-P Weightless-Private/Platanus Technology
NB-IoT Narrow Band Internet of Things WEIGHTLESS-W Weightless-Whitespace
NFC Near-Field Communication WIMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
TABLE III
COMPARISON WITH RELATED SURVEY ARTICLES.
Article Year Focus Smart M-IoT Security Privacy Trust Classifications Protocol Security Handover Security Framework Security
Medaglia et al. [25] 2010 IoT No Yes Yes No No No No No
Køien et al. [26] 2011 IoT No Yes No Yes No No No No
Bonetto et al. [27] 2012 IoT No Yes No No No Yes No No
Chang and Chen [28] 2012 IoT No No No Yes No No No No
Bhattasali et al. [29] 2013 IoT No Yes No No No No No No
Roman et al. [30] 2013 IoT No Yes Yes No Yes No No No
Yan et al. [31] 2014 IoT No No No Yes Yes No No No
Jing et al. [32] 2014 IoT No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Sicari et al. [38] 2015 IoT Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Arias et al. [39] 2015 IoT Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
Malina et al. [33] 2016 IoT No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
Li et al. [34] 2016 IoT No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
Zhou et al. [35] 2017 IoT No Yes Yes No No No No No
Yang et al. [36] 2017 IoT No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
Chen et al. [37] 2017 IoT No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Feng et al. [24] 2017 MC No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Yang et al. [40] 2017 IoT Yes Yes No No No Yes No No
Proposed 2018 IoT/M-IoT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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TABLE IV
SOME KEY CONTRIBUTIONS TO FOLLOW FOR SECURITY, PRIVACY AND TRUST IN SMART M-IOT.
Approach Author Ideology
TRIFECTA Sen et al. [327]
Security, Energy efficiency,
and Communication capacity
Jamming mitigation Tang et al. [328]
Hierarchical security
game
SEGB-AKA Parne et al. [329]
AKA protocol-based
solution
SNAuth protocol Dao et al. [330] Peer-aware communications
Low-cost security for
IoT
Mangia et al. [331]
Rakeness-based compressed
sensing
Enhanced
attestation and
security
Wang et al. [332]
Security-enhanced attestation
and policy-based
measurement mechanism
Traffic-aware patch-
ing
Cheng et al. [4]
Patching with limited resources
and time constraints
Secure game theo-
retic approach
Sedjelmaci et al. [333] Anomaly detection technique
Security access pro-
tocol
Giuliano et al. [334] Secure key renewal
Lightweight masked
AES
Yu et al. [335] Dynamic differential logic
Secure NFC-based
approach
Ulz et al. [336] RSSI based trilateration algorithm
Security situation
awareness
Xu et al. [337]
Semantic ontology and
user-defined rules
Privacy protector Luo et al. [338]
Slepian-wolf-coding-based secret
sharing
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TABLE V
TYPES OF ATTACKS IN M-IOT.
Type Attack Motive Vulnerability
Passive Interception Information disclose Insufficient authentication and validation
Release of message Information disclose Insufficient authentication and validation
Traffic analysis Information disclose Lack of encryption
Sniffing Information disclose Insufficient security validation
Keyloggers Information disclose Misconfiguration and design flaws
Active DoS Information distort and destruct Buffer overflow, Race condition
DDoS Information distort and destruct Buffer overflow, Race condition
Distributed DoS with Reflectors Information distort and destruct Buffer overflow, Race condition
Replay attack Information discovery Incorrect permissions, User and sever compromise
Masquerading Information discovery Insufficient security validation
SQL injection Information discovery Incorrect permissions
Man in the middle Information disclose and discovery Misconfiguration and design flaws, Insufficient security validation
Modification Information disclose and disrupt Misconfiguration and design flaws, Insufficient security validation
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TABLE VI: State-of-the-art frameworks applicable to M-IoT security.
Approach/
Model
Author
(Year)
Ideology Parameters
Focussed
Description
Policy driven
security
[Dsouza et al.
2014] [79]
Secure
collaboration for
users in Fog
networks
Security resources,
User authentication,
Device authentication
This approach focuses on a secure collaboration between the IoT de-
vices by using policy-management of resources through Fog computing
architecture. Policy enforcement point is used as a decisive metric,
but conflict resolution and anomaly detection are not evaluated in this
model.
IoT-OAS [Cirani et al.
2015] [80]
Authorization
architecture for
secure services
Computational overheads,
Memory utilization,
Energy consumption,
Authorization
This approach is based on Open Authorization (OAuth), which is a
third party for simple and secure authorization of services. HTTP/CoAP
services are targeted for security while maintaining the flexible, dynamic
and easily configurable properties of the architecture.
DFIF-IoT [Kebande and
Ray 2016] [92]
Digitalized
forensic
investigation of
IoT
Initialization,
Acquistion,
Investigation
This framework is capable of supporting digital forensics over IoT
infrastructures. The authors focused their framework with standard
compliance of ISO. The framework operates by classifying content
into digital forensic module through reactive and proactive processing.
Authorization
and access
control
[Pereira et al.
2014] [83]
Secure SOA for
IoT
CoAP overheads,
CoAP access control
This framework supports security of IoT devices by using a service
oriented architecture, which uses Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP) for IoT. This approach also provides strategy for tickets and
access control for utilizing the features of existing security protocols.
Security
assessment of
IoT
[Ge and Kim
2015] [90]
Evaluating
security of large
scale networks
Reliability,
Risk assessment,
Attack cost,
Attack success probability
This approach provides methodology and technique for assessing
security of large-scale IoT networks. The authors use a set of parameters
for analyzing the reliability of the network through risk assessment.
VeCure [Wang and
Sawhney
2014] [93]
Resolution of
mutual
authentication
issue for Internet
of vehicles
Trust formations,
Delay evaluations
This approach provides a mechanism for mutual authentication of nodes
in Internet of vehicles. The authors illustrated their approach through
a verified proof of concept and illustrated lower-delay approach for
message evaluations through trust properties.
SDN-based
security
framework
[Gonzalez et al.
2016] [84]
Security
framework for
IoT in grid using
SDN
Number of messages,
OpenFlow modifications
This framework builds a cluster model for IoT devices through SDN.
The common controller is employed to form an intrusion detection and
prevention system by using predefined rules on the controller.
Security
framework for
smart home IoT
[Tao et al.
2018] [96]
Multi-layer cloud
architecture-
based and
ontology-based
security
Response time,
Token assertion
This framework helps in privacy-preservation and maintain security of
devices in a multi-hierarchical cloud formation on the basis of ontology,
which is formulated over token and encryption assertions.
Continued on next page
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TABLE VI – continued from previous page
Approach/
Model
Author
(Year)
Ideology Parameters
Focussed
Description
Authorization
framework
[Seitz et al.
2013] [85]
Access control
and authorization
through key
management
Request processing time,
Accessibility
This framework supports a fine grained and a flexible access control
to devices with limited power and memory constraints. The framework
is capable of supporting authorization requirements of IoT devices.
SecIoT [Huang et al.
2016] [94]
Robust and
transparent
security for IoT
User authentication,
Device authentication,
Authorization,
Access management
This framework is capable of resolving the basic security requirements
such as authentication, authorization, access control and risk assessment.
Trust evaluation and availability are yet to be resolved by this framework
for IoT networks.
RFID security
framework
[Ray et al.
2014] [91]
Group-based and
collaborative
approach for
scalable security
Computational complexity,
Payload analysis,
Hash operations,
Probability evaluations,
Scalability tags
This framework emphasizes on the novel identification technique, which
is based on a hybrid approach that helps to support security check
handoff for RFID systems in an IoT environment.
SAFIR [Hernndez-
Ramos et al.
2015] [86]
Access
framework for
smart-buildings
IoT networks
Access control,
Authentication,
Evaluation time,
Discovery time,
Energy conservation
This framework focuses on the security and privacy of smart building
IoT networks. The framework provides security functional components
for the establishment of flexible sharing models, context-aware security
on IoT scenarios s realized through physical-context awareness.
Sensor to cloud
security
[Rahman et al.
2016] [97]
Cloud-IoT
ecosystem
security
Security threats Assessment,
(Sensor level, Network Level,
Cloud level, Data level)
This framework discusses IoT security framework for mitigating threats
identified in the sensor to cloud ecosystem. The framework uses layered
hierarchy for securing IoT devices.
SDN framework
for IoT
[Sahoo et al.
2015] [81]
SDN-based
security
framework
Accessibility,
Authentication
This framework helps to authenticate devices through policies which
are governed by the controller. Also, the policy rules are used for IoT
security by managing the node accessibility.
Trustworthy
smart car
services
[Pacheco et al.
2016] [82]
Anomaly
behavior analysis
Detection rate,
Classification Rate
This framework provided IoT security for trustworthy smart car services.
This framework uses a set of functions and services for securing these
services through threat modeling.
Adaptive security [Abie and
Balasingham
2012] [89]
Risk prediction
and assessment
Risk evaluation This framework focuses on a risk-based adaptive security for e-health
applications in IoT. The framework uses game theory and context-
awareness techniques for prediction of involved risks and upcoming
damages.
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TABLE VII: State-of-the-art protocols for M-IoT security.
Approach Author
(Year)
Ideology System
Integrity
Freshness Confidentiality Mutual
Authentication
Access
Control
Overheads Encryption Non-
repudiation
Light weight
authentication
[Amin et al.
2018] [148]
Distributed
cloud
computing
environment
7 3 3 3 - Medium 7 7
RFID
authentication
scheme
[Gope et al.
2017] [149]
Distributed
IoT
infrastructure
3 3 3 3 3 High 3 7
Anonymous
private
authentication
[Rahman et al.
2017] [154]
Security of
RFID systems
- 7 3 7 3 High 3 7
Key
agreement
mechanism
[Ermis et al.
2017] [155]
Partial
backward
confidentiality
- 7 3 7 3 Medium 3 7
two-way
authentication
[Kothmayr et
al. 2013]
[146]
DTLS based
security
3 7 3 7 3 Medium 3 7
Secure
authentication
scheme
[Kalra and
Sood 2015]
[150]
Authentication
of IoT and
cloud servers
- 3 3 3 3 Medium 3 7
User
authentication
scheme
[Dhillon and
Kalra 2017]
[156]
Lightweight
biometrics
based
3 7 3 3 3 Medium 3 7
Key
management
protocol
[Raza et al.
2012] [138]
Lightweight
IKEv2
7 7 7 7 - Medium 7 7
Constrained
application
protocol
[Raza et al.
2013] [157]
DTLS based
security
3 7 3 - 3 Low 3 7
End-to-End IP
security
[Hummen et
al. 2013]
[139]
Common
protocol
functionality-
based IP
security
3 3 - 3 - Medium 3 3
Continued on next page
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TABLE VII – continued from previous page
Approach Author
(Year)
Ideology System
Integrity
Freshness Confidentiality Mutual
Authentication
Access
Control
Overheads Encryption Non-
repudiation
Secure
multi-hop
routing
[Chze and
Leong 2014]
[137]
Secure IoT
Communica-
tion
7 7 - 7 - Medium 3 7
Two-phase
authentication
[Porambage et
al. 2014]
[147]
Authentication
of distributed
IoT
applications
3 3 - 3 3 Low 3 7
Authentication
protocol for
multimedia
[Mishra et al.
2017] [151]
Secure
multimedia
communica-
tions
7 3 3 3 3 Low 3 7
Authentication
and key
Agreement
[Alkuhlani
and Thorat
2017] [152]
Anonymity-
preserving
agreement
3 3 - 3 3 - 3 7
Secure route
optimization
[Shin et al.
2017] [129]
Security of
PMIPv6-smart
home IoT
3 3 3 3 3 Low 3 7
Remote user
authentication
scheme
[Sharma and
Kalra 2017]
[153]
Authentication
for
e-governance
applications
- 3 - 3 3 - 3 7
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TABLE VIII: State-of-the-art approaches for data privacy in M-IoT.
Approach Author
(Year)
Ideology Application
Area
Encryption End to
End
Security
Perfect
Forward
Secrecy
Persistence
against
Replay
attack
Password
Protection
Trust-
Assessment
End to end
privacy
[Jayaraman et al. 2017]
[170]
Privacy preserving IoT
architecture
IoT 3 3 7 3 7 3
Decentralized
anonymous
authentication
[Alcaide et al. 2013]
[166]
Privacy preserving
protocol
IoT target-
driven
applications
3 7 7 3 7 3
Multi-
authority
attribute based
encryption
[Belguith et al. 2018]
[171]
PHOABE
(Policy-Hidden
Outsourced ABE
scheme)
Cloud-
assisted
IoT
3 - 3 3 7 3
Privacy and
integrity
preservation
[Bamasag 2015] [172] ID-based signcryption
scheme
Smart grid 3 7 - 3 7 3
Identity-based
personal
location
system
[Hu et al. 2011] [173] Identity-based privacy
preservation
IoT 3 - 7 7 7 3
Data
protection
mechanism
[Doukas et al. 2012]
[174]
PKI encryption IoT
m-Health
devices
3 3 7 7 7 3
Privacy
management
mechanism
[Evans et al. 2012]
[167]
Efficient data tagging IoT 7 - 7 - 7 3
Attribute-
based
encryption
[Wang et al. 2014] [175] public key encryption IoT 3 - - - 7 3
Privacy
preservation
protocol
[Li et al. 2014] [176] Attribute-based
encryption (ABE) key
management
Smart grid 3 - 7 - 7 3
Reference
software
architecture
[Addo et al. 2014] [182] Collaborative pervasive
systems
Cloud
enabled IoT
applications
3 - 7 - 7 3
Continued on next page
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TABLE VIII – continued from previous page
Approach Author
(Year)
Ideology Application
Area
Encryption End to
End
Security
Perfect
Forward
Secrecy
Persistence
against
Replay
attack
Password
Protection
Trust-
Assessment
RERUM:Reliable,
Resilient and
secure IoT for
smart city
applications
[Pohls et al. 2014] [339] Smart object (SO)
hardware prototypes
Smart city
IoT
3 3 - 3 7 3
Private data
aggregation
with fault
tolerance
(DPAFT)
[Bao and Lu 2015]
[178]
Boneh-Goh-Nissim
cryptosystem
Smart grid 3 - - 3 7 3
Network-level
security and
privacy
[Sivaraman et al. 2015]
[340]
SDN-based approach Smart-
home
IoT
3 - - 3 7 3
Privacy
protection
mechanism
[Gong et al. 2015] [179] Lightweight private
homomorphism
algorithm and
encryption algorithm
Medical
IoT
3 - - 3 7 3
Data-centric
security
[Wrona et al. 2015]
[341]
End to End security
solution
Military
applications
3 3 - - 7 3
Lightweight
privacy-
preserving
data
aggregation
(LPDA)
[Lu et al. 2017] [180] Homomorphic Paillier
encryption, Chinese
Remainder theorem
Hybrid
IoTs
3 - - 3 7 3
Lightweight
data report
scheme
[Bao and Chen 2016]
[177]
Pseudonym
identity-based
privacy-preserving
Smart grid 3 - - 3 7 3
Negotiation-
based privacy
preservation
scheme
[Ukil et al. 2012] [168] Data masking tool IoT 7 7 7 3 7 3
CP-ABE
Application
[Perez et al. 2017] [169] Symmetric key
encryption techniques
IoT 3 - 3 3 7 3
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TABLE IX: State-of-the-art approaches applicable for trust management in M-IoT.
Approach Author
(Year)
Ideology Application
Area
Parameters
focused
Computational
Offloading
Visualization Reliability Security
Constraints
ORDAIN [Kravari and
Bassiliades
2017] [220]
Identification of social
and non-social metrics
IoT Social and Non-social
features
- 7 7 7
Multi-domain
trust
management
[Wu and Li
2017] [210]
Hierarchical trust
management framework
RFID Convergence speed,
Malicious event
detection rate, Mobility
- 7 - 3
Multidimensional
trust-based
anomaly
detection
[Gai et al.
2017] [224]
QoS and social
relationship
IoT Trust level evolvement,
False alarm rate,
Malicious nodes
percentage
- 7 3 3
CTM-IoT [Alshehri and
Hussain 2017]
[208]
Centralized trust
management
IoT Trust management
module, Communication
module
- 7 - -
Resilient
routing
mechanism
[Khan et al.
2017] [219]
Routing protocol for low
power and lossy
networks
IoT Delivery ratio, Path
length, Bad paths,
Network reliability
- 7 3 3
Trust-based
policy hidden
communica-
tion
[Peshwe and
Das 2017]
[212]
SIGMA-I - policy
hiding prefix based
encryption
IoT Private service discovery,
SIGMA-I, RSSI
- 7 - 3
Timely trust
establishment
[Yusof et al.
2017] [342]
Swift trust formation IoT Swift trust, Global
virtual teams
- 7 3 3
Hybrid
trust-based
IDS
[Ozcelik et al.
2017] [226]
Functional reputation
and misuse
WSNs Energy consumption,
Network lifetime
7 3 3 3
ANASTACIA [Ziegler et al.
2017] [213]
Trustworthy-by-design
autonomic
CPS-IoT Policy-based access
control, Smart security
planning
- 3 3 3
Trust-based
decision
making
[Al-Hamadi
and Chen
2017] [317]
Trust-based information
sharing
Health-IoT Correct decision ratio
(CDR), Malicious nodes
3 - 3 3
TMCoI-SIoT [Abderrahim
et al. 2017]
[318]
Trust management in
SIoT
SIoT Trust evaluation, Trust
prediction
- - 3 3
Continued on next page
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TABLE IX – continued from previous page
Approach Author
(Year)
Ideology Application
Area
Parameters
focused
Computational
Offloading
Visualization Reliability Security
Constraints
Trust
estimation
scheme
[Son et al.
2017] [216]
Interaction history and
stereotypical reputation
IoT Trust value - 7 - 3
Hierarchical
trust
management
[Guo and
Chen 2017]
[211]
Hierarchical trust
management in mobile
cloud
IoT Trust value 3 7 3 3
Trust-based
distributed
intrusion
detection
[Khan and
Herrmann
2017] [319]
Distributed IDS IoT False positives, False
negatives
7 7 7 -
Computational
offloading for
efficient trust
management
[Sharma et al.
2017] [217]
Osmotic computing POSNs Trust visualization,
Monitoring cost,
Average osmosis time
3 3 3 7
Trust
management
via SOA
[Chen et al.
2016] [209]
Distributed collaborative
filtering
SOA-based
IoT
Trust value, Decay
parameter, Trust
convergence
7 - - -
Trust-based
access control
[Mahalle et al.
2013] [215]
Fuzzy-based approach IoT Energy consumption,
Residual energy
7 7 - -
TRM-IoT [Chen et al.
2011] [218]
Fuzzy-reputation IoT End-to-end packet
forwarding ratio (EPFR),
Energy consumption,
Convergence speed,
Detection probability
7 7 7 7
Cooperative
spectrum
sensing data
fusion
[Wang et al.
2018] [225]
Mechanism design
theory
Cognitive
radio
networks
Malicious nodes
percentage, Decision
rate, Trust threshold
7 7 7 7
Cooperative
trust relaying
and privacy
preservation
[Sharma et al.
2017] [130]
Edge-crowdsourcing via
fission computing
SIoT Fission time, Combined
entropy, Integration cost,
Per node relaying time
3 3 7 7
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TABLE X: State-of-the-art approaches for physical layer security in M-IoT.
Approach Author
(Year)
Ideology Application
Area
Parameters
focused
Computational
Complexity
Memory
Consumption
Energy
Efficiency
Scalability Secrecy
Security
enhancement
against
eavesdropping
[Xu et al.
2016] [242]
Secure relay
communica-
tions in
IoT
IoT Secrecy outage
probability, Secrecy rate,
Achievable
communication distance
- - - High 3
Securing
uplink
transmissions
[Chen et al.
2016] [243]
Light-weight
mechanism for
preventing
eavesdropping
MIMO-IoT Symbol error rate Low - - High 3
Securing
cyber-physical
communica-
tions
[Xu et al.
2017] [343]
Security aware
wave
formations
CPS Secrecy rate, Transmit
energy
Low - High High 3
Channel aware
security
[Choi 2017]
[247]
Opportunistic
jamming
IoT Secrecy rate, Achievable
rate, Outage Probability
- - High High 3
Physical layer
security
[Hu et al.
2017] [248]
Cooperative
jamming in
IoT
IoT Secrecy outage
probability, Power
allocation ratio,
- - High High 3
Secure com-
munications in
C-IoT
[Li et al.
2016] [249]
Worst case
channel
jamming for
spectrum
leasing
Cognitive-
IoT
SINR,
Energy-harvesting,
Channel Uncertainty
High - High - 3
Secure
distributed
Detection in
IoT
[Zhang and
Sun 2016]
[244]
Security in
energy-
constrained
IoT networks
IoT Error probability, SNR Low - High High 3
Secure com-
munications in
CIoT
[Hu et al.
2017] [245]
Secure energy-
efficient relay
communica-
tions
Cognitive-
IoT
Secure transmission rate,
SNR
- - High - 3
Security
enhancement
during
inteference
[Islam et al.
2017] [246]
Confidential
transmission
in IoT-relays
IoT Mean square error, SNR - - - High 3
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TABLE XI: Proactive authentication mechanisms for secure handovers.
Approach Author
(Year)
Ideology Scalable Latency Bandwidth Handoff
Time
Mutual
Authentication
Location
Privacy
Delay optimization
handoffs
[Lopez et al. 2007]
[344]
Network layer
authentication
- - - Low 7 7
BASH [He and Perkins
2008] [345]
Backhaul-aided seamless
handovers
3 Low High Low 7 7
Efficient handover
authentication
[Fu et al. 2012] [346] Privacy preservation for
802.16m
3 - - High 3 3
Ticket-based
handoffs
[Xu et al. 2014]
[143]
Handoff authentication
for mesh networks
- - - - 3 3
Secure and efficient
handovers
[Zhang et al. 2014]
[347]
Authentication using
EAP in wireless
networks
3 - High Medium 3 7
Fast pre-hand
authentication
[Chien et al. 2008]
[348]
Minimized overhead and
high security
- Low - Low 3 7
Handover
authentication
[Choi and Jung 2010]
[349]
Backhaul-aided seamless
handovers
3 Low - Medium 3 3
Re-authentication
for 3GPP
[Shidhani and Leung
2011] [350]
Mutual re-authentication - Low - Low 3 7
Secure continuous
handovers
[Kalong et al. 2010]
[351]
Dynamic key
management
3 Low High - 3 7
Handover for
seamless
multimedia
transmissions
[Saxena and Roy
2011] [352]
Proactive authentication
over 802.11
3 Low High - 7 7
Privacy preserving
handover
[Jing et al. 2011]
[353]
EAP-based wireless
networks
3 Low - Low 3 7
Secure inter-ASN
handovers
[Nguyen and Ma
2012] [354]
EAP-based
pre-authentication
3 Low - Medium 3 7
Mechanism for
E-UTRAN and
Non-3GPP
[Cao et al. 2012]
[271]
Uniform handover
authentication
3 Low - - 3 7
CPAL [Lai et al. 2014]
[355]
Privacy-preserving
authentication with
access linkability
- Low - High 3 7
Secure fast WLAN
handoff
[Chien and Hsu
2009] [356]
Time-bound delegated
authentication
3 Low - - 3 7
Re-authentication
scheme for
handovers
[Ma et al. 2013]
[357]
Proxy signature
approach
3 Low High - 3 7
Handauth [He et al. 2013]
[358]
Authentication with
conditional privacy
3 Low - - 3 7
EAP-based
pre-authentication
[Wang et al. 2017]
[359]
Inter-WRAN Handover
authentication
3 Low - Low 3 7
Fast handovers in
5G Xhaul
[Sharma et al. 2018]
[141]
Secure and fast handoffs
in 5G-Xhaul and IoT
3 Low - Low 3 3
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TABLE XII: Approaches for secure handovers in M-IoT.
Approach Author
(Year)
Ideology Application
Area
Parameters
focused
Mutual
Authentication
Handoff
Time
Latency Reliability Security
Constraints
Inter-LMA
domain
handover
[Chai et al.
2017] [267]
Proxy-based
FPMIPv6
Mobile
IPv6
networks
Handover latency 3 Low Low - 3
Mobility
management
scheme
[Chai et al.
2015] [268]
Proxy-based
FPMIPv6
IoT Handover latency,
Inter-domain movement
- Low Low - 3
Uniform
handover
[Cao et al.
2012] [360]
E-UTRAN LTE-A
Networks
Signaling
messages,Computational
cost
- - - - 3
Uniform
handover
[Haddad et al.
2016] [272]
Authentication
and
registration
with HSS
LTE-A
networks
Computational delay,
Communication
overhead, Storage cost
3 Low Low - 3
Session key
management
[Kong et al.
2017] [361]
Mobile
relaying-based
session
management
LTE-A
networks
Computational delay,
Communication
overhead, Storage cost
3 Low Low - 3
Secure and
efficient
protocol
[Sharma et al.
2018] [141]
Key exchange
and
authentication
5G-Xhaul Handover latency,
Failure factor, Signaling
overheads
3 Low Low 3 3
Route
optimization
[Shin et al.
2017] [129]
PMIPv6-based
RO
Smart
home IoT
networks
Transmission rate,
Packet loss, Network
throughput
3 Low Low - 3
Seamless
handover
[Feirer et al.
2017] [362]
IEEE
802.11k-based
handover
Industrial
WLAN
Message overhead 7 Low - - 3
Authentication
protocol
[Saxena et al.
2016] [270]
Symmetric key
cryptosystem
LTE
Networks
Storage overhead,
Computation overhead,
Bandwidth consumption
3 - Low - 3
Mutual
authentication
handoff
[Ndibanje et
al. 2017]
[269]
RSS and
PKC-based
protocol
IoT-Sensor
networks
RSS 3 Low - 3 3
